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The Aid Morass
by Charles Flickner
t was a strange winter in
Washington. The warmest
January ever was bracketed
by extreme cold in November
and March. The cherry trees
and magnolias weren't the on-
ly ones confused. The capital city
itself couldn't decide how to re-
spond to the astonishing changes
in Eastern Europe and Central
America. It's blowing hot and cold
on the prospects for US aid.
As many pundits bemoan Wash-
ington's supposedly parsimonious
response to appeals for assistance,
the gap between myth and reality
in the federal government grows
larger. Perhaps the most common
assessment was reflected by a New
York Times headline, "Congress,
Hoping to Aid New Democracies,
Finds Itself Shackled by Budget."
The executive branch could re-
spond, if it had a common voice,
"Look, we've sent up to Capitol
Hill generous appropriations re-
quests. Why doesn't Congress get
off the dime and act?"
Politics on the Hill
Returning from a December 1989
trip to Latin America, Senate
Republican leader Bob Dole broke
a Washington taboo regarding the
sanctity of foreign aid levels to
Israel and Egypt, the Camp David
twins. Dole suggested that the
only way for the US to help emerg-
ing democracies in Eastern
Europe and Latin America would
be to reduce aid for the current
major beneficiaries: Israel, Egypt,
Pakistan, and Turkey.
Charles Flickner is a Senate
Republican staff member.
Almost no members of Con-
gress stood forward with Dole, but
few criticized him. Senate Appro-
priations Committee chair Robert
Byrd joined in the attack on cur-
rent aid priorities, but didn't focus
on Latin America. By April the
Bush administration made it clear
that, unless the global sum of
foreign aid was expanded, it too
would favor "shaving" the existing
levels for traditional recipients, in-
cluding Egypt and Israel.
The fiscal 1991 budget process
is dead in the water. With the
Democratic Congress and the
Republican president at odds over
defense spending and taxes, in-
siders are betting that an across-
the-board sequester (a kidnapping
or cancellation of appropriations)
will occur in October. Only
maverick Ways and Means Com-
mittee chair Dan Rostenkowski
has shown the courage to offer a
proposal that actually reduces the
deficit to the Gramm-Rudman tar-
get of $66 billion.
With gridlock anticipated for
next year's budget, the scramble is
on to stuff additional domestic
and international spending into
the budget for the current fiscal
year, which ends on September
30. There's one obstacle, though.
This year's budget is already $4 bil-
lion over the Gramm-Rudman ceil-
ing. Additional spending for
Panama and Nicaragua, not to
mention Eastern Europe, requires
a 60-vote supermajority in the
Senate to set aside the budget
ceiling.
Following the precedent set
with several of the contra aid pack-
ages, the Bush administration
opted to offset its $800-million aid
package for Panama and Nicara-
gua with equal reductions in the
defense budget. When on Febru-
ary 26 the defeat of Daniel Ortega
in Nicaragua's presidential elec-
tion surprised Washington,
detailed legislation to implement
the Panama package was put on
hold until it could be combined
with assistance for Nicaragua.
This package, too, is to be paid for
by the Defense Department, but it
has become so bogged down in
Capitol Hill politics that Dole
stated that Nicaraguan president
Violeta Chamorro's "first term
may expire before we get the aid
down there."
It is clear no supplemental ap-
propriation (i.e. stuffing items into
the current budget) is likely to
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become law before mid-summer.
Advocates of domestic spending
were unwilling to pass a "clean"
supplemental budget limited to
international items on the
president's "must do" list without
adding some of the items they
deemed urgent or unlikely to sur-
vive a Gramm-Rudman sequester.
Bush and Central America
On March 13 President Bush final-
ly decided to take personal respon-
sibility for expediting both the
Panama package and a newly an-
nounced $300-million Nicaraguan
aid package through Congress.
Was he concerned about the
health of Panama's president
Guillermo Endara, who was then
engaged in a marathon fast
against the slow US response?
Bush's ability to get his way with
Congress should not be under-
estimated. His veto of the bill to
extend visas for Chinese students
demonstrated what a dogged
Bush could accomplish.
The proposed Panama aid
package set an unusual precedent.
The administration admitted that
$130 million would be the US
share of an international effort to
pay off more than $540 million
owed by Panama to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), and the World Bank.
Although US bilateral funds have
been used elsewhere in Latin
America to pay arrears and prime
the pump for new multilateral
bank loans, it has never been done
openly.
It will be intriguing to see how
Congress-not to mention Nicara-
gua and Panama, for whom a
similar arrangement is sug-
gested-will react to using US
grant funds to keep alive the myth
that the multilateral banks never
make bad loans.
The Brady Plan to reduce the
commercial debt-service require-
ments of selected countries does
not address the problems many
smaller Latin American and Carib-
bean nations have with paying off
loans to the IMF, the World Bank,
and the IDB. While the integrity
of these institutions is important,
so too may be their willingness to
accept that some of their loans
turn out sour, just like any other
banking institution.
A bipartisan agreement on
security assistance to El Salvador
is in the works. Secretary of State
James Baker inconclusively ap-
pealed for such an agreement in a
Y
February 28 statement and held
several private meetings on the
Hill to discuss the matter. The
murder of six Jesuits may have
been the last straw for Republican
stalwarts on military aid to El
Salvador. It certainly was for
Democrats.
The fear in Latin America, that
the attractions of newly demo-
cratic Eastern Europe will divert
development aid and investment,
may prove to be greatly exag-
gerated. Except for Poland, there
is little public support for massive
aid to Eastern Europe. Besides,
some of the new democracies
know too well the hidden costs of
hosting a huge aid establishment,
and don't want traditional foreign
aid. Clearly US bilateral aid to
Latin America and the Caribbean
will remain far larger than assis-
tance to Eastern Europe. The
drug war will insure that.
One of the positive results of
the US obsession with Central
America over the past decade is a
core of insiders on Capitol Hill
who have a lot invested in the
isthmus. Extensive travel and new
friendships bind many of our
leaders with those in Central
America. In Washington those
ties count.
Latin America and the Carib-
bean may benefit from the new
approach many are taking to East-
ern Europe. The first question
asked now is, "What are your
plans?" That question is followed
by, "What do you need?" and
"How can we help?" There is less
emphasis on dollar totals. To ask
first, "How much?" is to risk being
accused of "throwing money at
the problem," and few politicians
do that in the 1990s. .
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Negotiating Shock
by Mark B. Rosenberg
n the midst of growing scar-
cities in gasoline, medicine,
and basic fo dstuffs, Rafael
Leonardo Callejas was in-
augurated as the new presi-
dent of Honduras in January
1990. Callejas, who leads the Par-
tido Nacional, won the presidential
election in November 1989 with
more than 50% of the popular
vote and a commanding majority
in the country's unicameral Con-
greso Nacional.
The new president is the most
skilled and capable leader of Hon-
duras in this century. Callejas is in-
telligent, disciplined, and forward-
looking. His youth belies his
maturity. Just 46 years old, Calle-
jas has served in a variety of gov-
ernment posts and as a cabinet
minister. He has campaigned on
the Partido Nacional's presidential
ticket three times, first as a vice-
presidential candidate in the early
1980s. Following his party's defeat
in 1981, he cautiously negotiated
his ascendancy through a political
thicket characterized by cronyism,
old-boy networks, and proverbial
smoke-filled rooms. The force of
his personality and political acu-
men were decisive in his rise.
Now in the office to which he
has long aspired, Callejas presides
over a ruptured economy and a
bankrupt government. The
party's governing plan for 1990-
94 states that per capita income is
13% lower than in 1980. In terms
of economic development, the
1980s were a wasted decade.
Callejas has few economic op-
tions, none of them good. Unlike
his predecessors, he cannot barter
use of Honduran territory for a
blank-check supply of economic
aid. Indeed, even before he took
office, the US clearly signaled that
the "wink-and-nod" days were
over. A $70-million line of credit
from the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development was put on
hold to lever the outgoing govern-
ment to initiate strong macro-
economic reforms. Honduras had
earlier been declared ineligible for
new funds by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund.
But how does a government
negotiate "austerity shock" when
most of the country's citizens al-
ready live in poverty? Callejas him-
self recites the ugly figures: 20% of
the population earns under
US$0.50 a day and the average
annual income is under US$400.
Getting Ready
Confronting imminent economic
and fiscal apocalypse upon enter-
ing office, the new president took
measures to prepare himself for
the thankless task of restructuring
the Honduran economy. First,
Callejas mounted a comprehen-
sive study team to identify the
country's problems and develop
alternative policy responses. With
the financial assistance of the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy,
a Partido Nacional think-tank gave
exhaustive attention to the coun-
try's economic problems. The core
of this analysis subsequently ap-
peared in the government's Plan
de Gobierno 1990-94.
Second, Callejas enlisted Partido
Nacional advisers to work with two
US economists, Arnold C. Har-
berger and Daniel L. Wisecarver,
to develop a comprehensive plan
to restructure the economy.
"Policies for Efficiency and
Growth in a Market-oriented
Economy" (January 1990) is a
fascinating document from the
neoclassical school of economics,
written at the behest of the Consejo
Hondurefio de la Empresa Privada.
The study outlines two points
about the Honduran economy:
A large and growing fiscal deficit
accounts for the crisis in the
country's balance of payments
and arrears in its foreign debt
obligations.
* Due to efforts to maintain both
the exchange rate and some
foreign exchange reserves, the
economy's price structure, in in-
ternal terms and relative to the
world market, became extreme-
ly distorted.
According to the authors, there
is no realistic alternative to fiscal
austerity through revenue in-
creases and expenditure cuts.
They advocate, then, the "shock
treatment" from which so many
Latin American and Caribbean
countries are now reeling.
The Harberger-Wisecarver
document outlines what the con-
tent of economic reform should
be. What it does not address is the
thorny and perhaps more difficult
issue of how the treatment should
be applied.
A "How to" Guide
A Wall Street Journal op-ed article
(January 17, 1990), written by
Roger Douglas, a former New
Zealand government official,
helped to provide the operational
guideposts that Callejas needed.
Douglas claims that "the idea that
governments can retain power by
refusing to make necessary and
valuable structural reforms is, in
fact, nonsense." "Quality"
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medium-term policies, he writes,
must be enacted by reform-
oriented governments without
compromise. Douglas concludes
that consensus will develop only if
concessions are not made to spe-
cial interest groups.
To attach the austerity elec-
trodes to the Honduran body
politic, Callejas seems to be follow-
ing the principles that Douglas
suggests. For example, Douglas
argues that "you need quality
people for quality policies." Calle-
jas has surrounded himself with
one of the most skilled cabinets
ever assembled in Central Amer-
ica. Known derisively by the op-
position press as the "Chicago
Boys," the cabinet is a clear depar-
ture from the crony-oriented polit-
ical chambas of earlier presidents.
Douglas further argues that
reform should be implemented in
"quantum leaps" and that "speed
is essential." Initially Callejas es-
chewed this advice in calling for
"national concertation." Yet once
he understood that it would be im-
possible to gain consensus in ad-
vance of strong reforms, Callejas
moved swiftly. In early March
1990 he pushed his entire pack-
age, including a floating exchange
rate, lowered tariffs, higher sales
and income taxes, and the stream-
lining of investment regulations,
through the Congreso Nacional. In
the process, Callejas accom-
plished, at least on paper, what no
democratically elected civilian
politician would have dared in the
1980s: the reform of the Hon-
duran economy to make it more
competitive in the international
commercial and financial markets.
"Let the dog see the rabbit,"
another Douglas guideline, has
also informed the president's ac-
tions. This principle calls for clear
and continual statements to the
public about the nature of the
economic problems, the govern-
ment's objectives in addressing
them, and the costs and benefits
of the options pursued. Callejas
has therefore opened himself to
the country's perfervid press, and
has asked his cabinet members to
follow his lead. These officials are
receiving high marks for the plain
language they use to explain the
government's new policies.
Still another suggestion by
Douglas for would-be reformers is
"Don't blink; public confidence
rests on your composure." Organ-
ized labor has already demon-
strated against the measures, and
a number of ministers have been
chastised behind the scenes by
private-sector kingpins whose
market monopolies are threat-
ened by the reform package. Al-
though the package will raise
prices significantly, Callejas main-
tains a close working relationship
with key labor union leaders-
some of whom were previously
given high positions in the party
or offices in the presidential
palace. This gentle form of co-op-
tation, which stands in deep con-
trast to the fate of labor union
leaders in other Central American
countries, is distinctively Hon-
duran. It should give the presi-
dent the margin of political space
he needs to implement his policies.
Not that Callejas has been in-
timidated by his friends in the
private sector. In this respect he
seems to grasp Douglas's argu-
ment that the "abolition of
privilege is the essence of struc-
tural reform." Even though the
president and many cabinet mem-
bers are stridently pro-business,
many private-sector leaders view
them with suspicion because of
the new administration's hold on
political power. Yet because the
president has not isolated himself
from the business sector, he con-
tinues to enjoy their support.
Along the same "anti-privilege"
lines, the new economic measures
rescind the duty-free imports en-
joyed by the armed forces. Calle-
jas's efforts to reduce the power
and privileges of the military may
well be the Achilles' heel of the
austerity package. The Honduran
armed forces, however, are no
longer empowered with the hard-
line security mission that the
regional militarization of the
1980s gave them. Riddled with
petty personal rivalries and cor-
ruption, the military may take its
austerity medicine too. Callejas
can succeed without their sup-
port, but his chances are much
greater if the military commits it-
self publicly to his efforts.
Douglas's useful column does
not address the country's most dif-
ficult issue: how to deal with the
US Embassy. Most embassy offi-
cials, though, are jubilant about
the Callejas commitment to struc-
tural reform. They are backing
their enthusiasm with aggressive
lobbying in Washington for the
additional economic assistance
that is crucial to the reform pro-
gram.
Callejas has taken the initiative
and has the vision and political
perspicacity to hold his ground.
Nonetheless, he needs all the help
he can get. If this president can-
not accomplish structural econom-
ic reform, no other Honduran
can. .
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Human Rights: Peruvian Responses
by Michael Shifter
P eru's human rights
record is among the
most troubling in Latin
America. Since 1987 the
UN Human Rights Com-
mission has ranked Peru
first among nations in the number
of desaparecidos. International
rights organizations, such as
Americas Watch and Amnesty In-
ternational, point to patterns of
summary execution and torture
by Peru's security forces. Roughly
half the population of the
country's coastal, mountain, and
jungle regions lives under a state
of emergency.
Since the early 1980s this grim
situation has prompted Peru's
nongovernmental human rights
organizations to respond. Their
response has primarily taken the
traditional form of monitoring
government violations. Rights
groups have documented abuses
by Peruvian security forces and
denounced the governments of
Fernando Belaunde (1980-85)
and Alan Garcia (1985-90). The
groups hold the government
responsible-through complicity
or passivity-for violations against
its citizens.
Yet Peru's human rights situa-
tion has never been entirely con-
ventional. The Belaunde and
Garcia governments were civilian
and democratically elected, in con-
trast to the military rule in Uru-
guay, Argentina, and Chile during
the 1970s, which gave the impetus
to human rights efforts in those
countries. Still, Peruvian human
rights organizations followed the
traditional approach and pressed
the government to honor its legal
and political commitments.
In the past few years, however,
two tendencies complicated Peru's
already unconventional situation:
the growing strength of the
Maoist insurgency Sendero Lumi-
noso and the progressive weaken-
ing of the Peruvian state. For
Sendero, "human rights" is a bour-
geois notion, and any form of
dialogue and negotiation is out of
the question. Meanwhile the
weakened state can neither deal
effectively with the insurgency nor
provide basic protection for its
citizens. Insurgency and break-
down have taken place in a con-
text of unprecedented economic
crisis, an expanding drug econ-
omy, and political polarization.
Over the last decade the spiral of
political violence has claimed
more than 18,000 Peruvian lives.
In response many of Peru's
nongovernmental human rights
groups realize their traditional ap-
proach is inadequate. The tradi-
tional approach to human rights-
including the monitoring and
criticism of government viola-
tions-fails to take into account
the growing impact of abuses by
insurgents and the ineffectiveness
of the state.
Thus an alternative approach is
in the making. Seeking not to sup-
plant but to build upon the tradi-
tional approach, the new, more
affirmative one displays several
characteristics: it documents insur-
gent atrocities, strives for balance
and consensus, aims to strengthen
a nonviolent democratic center,
and stresses the education and
training of key sectors of civil
society. The emerging approach
responds in part to public opinion
that wonders whether rights viola-
tions might be an inevitable price
to pay for fighting guerrillas. It in-
cludes a new and fundamental
question: can Peru deal effectively
with insurgent groups within a
democratic framework that
respects human rights?
Insurgents and the State
Sendero Luminoso, which emerged
nearly a decade ago as an armed
force in the impoverished depart-
ment of Ayacucho, is now in firm
command in the coca-rich Upper
Huallaga Valley, and enjoys a sub-
stantial presence in Junin, a key
center of food production, trans-
portation, and communication.
Even coastal cities, including
Lima, are witness to a rise in Sen-
dero activity. Curiously only where
there are effective state surro-
gates, such as church and peasant
organizations in Puno, have Sen-
dero advances been stalled.
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the Andean Region/Southern Cone Of-
fice of the Ford Foundation.
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The insurgency's targets are no
longer restricted to government
party representatives, police and
military officials, and, most tragi-
cally, peasants who often have lit-
tle choice but to collaborate with
such government personnel. Sen-
dero's aim of gaining local support
among the population's organized
sectors has meant that the guer-
rillas' main competitors in this
strategy-labor leaders, develop-
ment workers, priests, judges,
teachers, and opposition politi-
cians-have also been threatened,
intimidated, and killed. Particular-
ly alarming to the country's exten-
sive network of service and re-
search organizations working in
rural development was Sendero's
brutal assassination of peasant
leader Victor Lozano and anthro-
pologist Manuel Soto in Huan-
cayo in January 1989. Although
the municipal elections of Novem-
ber 1989 took place without major
problems, Sendero's campaign of
pre-election terror against local of-
ficials left a vacuum of authority-
and a climate of fear-in many
communities.
Violence also characterizes the
tactics of Peru's second guerrilla
group, the five-year-old Movi-
miento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
(MRTA). Although widely re-
garded as much less formidable
and worrisome than Sendero,
MRTA (or at least a faction of the
movement) may be adopting some
of the Maoist group's tactics, as
evidenced by the January 1990
assassination of Peru's former
defense minister, Enrique L6pez
Abujar.
Faced with economic and politi-
cal crisis, the Peruvian govern-
ment has responded ineffectively
to such threats. Its policy tends to
favor military over political strat-
egies, though the emphasis varies
depending on the region and the
military official in charge. Many
analysts observe that in areas such
as Ayacucho and parts of the jun-
gle region, the government's
counterinsurgency efforts some-
times deepen the resentment of
the local population against the
security forces, thereby inadver-
tently adding to Sendero's popular
support.
Such support was evidenced in
March 1989, when Sendero success-
fully attacked the police base in
the jungle town of Uchiza, leaving
ten officers dead. The towns-
people reportedly witnessed pub-
lic executions with little outrage.
Nearby military units failed to
respond and provide support to
the embattled police during the
six-hour assault, a dramatic dis-
play of the Peruvian government's
lack of coordination in combating
the insurgency.
An army general directing
military operations in the Upper
Huallaga Valley reportedly had
some success in fighting Sendero,
chiefly by appealing to the hearts
and minds of the local population.
But the widely publicized ap-
proach proved to be at odds with
a drug policy that gave highest
priority to defeating the drug traf-
fickers in the area.
The growth of Sendero and ero-
sion of state capacity help account
for the July 1988 emergence of a
loosely coordinated network of
paramilitary groups known as the
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Comando Rodrigo Franco. (The net-
work takes its name from the
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana [APRA] party official
who was killed by Sendero in
1987.) According to a recent Peru-
vian congressional investigation,
the Comando is linked to sectors of
the current APRA government.
The paramilitary groups have
murdered several leftists and have
threatened and intimidated jour-
nalists, politicians, professors,
labor leaders, and television per-
sonalities. That the government
has failed to recognize, and take
action against, the Comando has
further frustrated human rights
efforts.
Innovative Approaches
Until the last few years, criticism
of insurgent actions served mostly
as an appendage to denunciations
against government abuses. In
striving for greater balance and
public credibility, however, some
rights groups are now calling at-
tention to the abuses committed
by both sides in the country's in-
ternal conflict.
Meanwhile the limitations of
traditional frameworks have led to
a reassessment of juridical ap-
proaches to human rights. Some
leading advocates-including
Diego Garcia-Sayan, executive
director of the Lima-based Comi-
si6n Andina de juristas, and Carlos
Chipoco, one of the founders of
the Instituto de Defensa Legal-
argue for the application of inter-
national humanitarian law to deal
with internal armed conflict and
political violence. They point to
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, which focuses on the
rights of noncombatants and on
medical attention to the wounded.
Garcia-Sayan urges open discus-
sion about whether Sendero's de
facto control over some of Peru's
territory offers a sound juridical
basis for maintaining that the in-
surgency is guilty of human rights
violations. This posture would
depart from the conventional
human rights approach that says
abuses can, strictly speaking, be
committed only by government
forces.
Also rethinking traditional ap-
proaches are Americas Watch,
Amnesty International, and other
international organizations. For
example, in its October 1988
report on Peru, Americas Watch
devotes a full section to "Viola-
tions of the Laws of War Com-
mitted by the Insurgents."
Human rights groups, national
and international, are collaborat-
ing in working out the new con-
ceptual challenges.
What are the practical implica-
tions of such new thinking? Many
Peruvian rights groups are target-
ing key institutions that at best are
neglected by the state. Since 1988,
for instance, the Comisidn Andina
deJuristas has undertaken a train-
ing program for judges, prose-
cutors, and lawyers, aimed at ena-
bling them to perform their roles
more effectively within an other-
wise weak judicial system. The
three-day courses encourage the
use of habeas corpus writs and
focus on ways to secure basic con-
stitutional guarantees. In an effort
to minimize corruption, promote
the rule of law, and improve
human rights conditions, the pro-
gram provides a service to judicial
personnel, who often are working
at considerable risk, in places such
as Lima, Ica, Puno, Huancayo,
Cuzco, and Trujillo.
Concurrently human rights
education in Peru has become
among the most sophisticated in
Latin America. Through a variety
of educational methodologies and
pedagogic materials, educators
are fostering the rule of law and
the exercise of basic rights and
responsibilities "from below."
Coordinating these efforts is the
Red Peruana de Educaci6n en Dere-
chos Humanos, which consists of six
organizations: the Escuela de Dere-
chos Humanos del Instituto de Defen-
sa Legal, the Comisi6n Andina de
Juristas, the Comisidn Episcopal de
Acci6n Social, the Centro de Estudios
y Accidn para la Paz, the Instituto
Peruano de Educaci6n en Derechos
Humanos y la Paz, and the Centro
Amaz6nico de Antropologia y Aplica-
ci6n Prdctica.
As the political crisis deepens,
the Red Peruana de Educaci6n en
Derechos Humanos is intensifying its
activities, working together with
an array of local organizations-in-
cluding churches, labor unions,
public and private schools, and
adult and youth groups-through-
out Peru. Such activities can be
properly measured only in the
long term. Nonetheless, they are
supporting sectors ignored by the
state and perhaps susceptible to
Sendero advances.
Some human rights groups are
complementing such activities by
exploring alternative perspectives
on political violence in Peru. Since
1987 the Instituto de Defensa Legal
has organized public discussions
that involve representatives of
diverse political tendencies, includ-
ing the Marxist and non-Marxist
left, APRA, and the Frente
Democrdtico, the center-right coali-
tion headed by novelist and
presidential candidate Mario Var-
gas Llosa. Further, in an August
1989 working paper, the Instituto
presents a range of views about a
controversial issue: the supplying
of arms by the government to
peasant self-defense committees in
Peru's emergency zones.
Peru's human rights situation-
and the emerging responses of
some nongovernmental rights
groups-is perhaps unique in
Latin America. Although rights ad-
vocates in, say, El Salvador and
Colombia are also increasingly
stressing principles of humanitar-
ian law, the extremism of Sendero
sets the Peruvian case apart. Also
without parallel in Latin America
is the fact that the victims of
Peru's armed insurgency include
members of popular organizations
and social movements with histori-
cally close ties to human rights
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groups. And while the weakness of
the state is not peculiar to Peru, in
possibly no other country has this
problem been so acute and have
human rights groups so clearly
acted to fill the vacuum and as-
sume the offensive.
Can these incipient human
rights efforts help to reverse
Peru's deteriorating situation?
The obstacles to reaching out to
diverse sectors of civil society are
considerable, and programs in-
volving the mass media could be
much stronger. Rights groups
themselves wonder about their
own impact, often questioning
whether Peru's fundamental
problems of violence and govern-
mental breakdown are amenable
to even innovative and well-con-
ceived strategies. Indeed, in a dis-
turbing development, in February
and March 1990 some Lima-based
rights organizations were the tar-
gets of attacks.
The vast majority of Peruvians
are hoping the next government,
scheduled to begin in July 1990,
will do better than the Garcia ad-
ministration in addressing political
violence. Yet none of the presiden-
tial candidates, including the
surprise first-round and run-off
winner Alberto Fujimori, engaged
in serious discussion about coun-
terinsurgency policy. Their failure
to do so was troubling.
Most analysts agree that the
Fujimori government is likely to
confront the Sendero insurgency-
and the process of social disin-
tegration-for some time to come.
As the politics are played out,
Peruvian human rights groups
will continue their resourceful,
often courageous, efforts to but-
tress the country's fragile political
democracy. .
Editor's Note: Responsibility for the
views expressed in this article lies solely
with the author, and not with the Ford
Foundation.
Debt, Environment, Development, Human Rights, Technology,
Agriculture and Economics...
Third WorldQuarterlyhas established a unique reputation over the
past decade as the leading policy journal on contemporary Third
World affairs.
Third World Quarterly lends an unmatched critical perspective on
global problems and provides an analysis of important issues
concerning the Asia/Pacific region, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East.
Third World Quarterly is published in January, April, July and
October. Each issue runs to approximately 300 pages, over 80 of
which are devoted to literature and book reviews - both fiction
and non-fiction.
Past contributors have included:
Morris J. Blachman
Kenneth Sharpe
Louis Rene Beres
Peter Flynn
Oliver Tambo
Walden Bello
James Painter
Laurence Harris
Carolina G
Hernandez
Naseer Aruri
Chibli Mallat
Nader Entessar
Yasser Arafat
Farouq Kaddoumi
James Petras
Mahathir Mohamad
Guy Martin
James Dinkerley
Raul Alfonsin
Barnett R Rubin
Claudia Wright
Robert C Johansen
Alan Garcia Perez
Rudiger Dornbusch
Ibrahim F I Shihata
Ali A Mazrui
Haleh Afshar
Riodan Roett
Feroz Ahmad
Arturo Valenzuela
George Joffe
Yezid Sayigh
Lionel Cliffe
Shridath Ramphal
Sheldon W Simon
'rice $34.00/£23 p a.
Subscription: Send your order to:
:irculation Manager, Third World Quarterly, Rex House,
st Floor, 4-12 Lower Regent Street, London SW1Y 4PE
Please send me Third World Quarterly for one year, starting with
the O January Q April O July O October issue.
Name
Address
I enclose a cheque for made payable to Third World Quarterly.
Plpease hchargenp my credit card Name nf rard
Name of cardholder Card account no.
Fyniry riata Signature
Hemisphere . Winter/Spring 1990
W I VV ..... ....... .. .. JlV Ve
" "
Reports: Austerity
Austerity and Labor
by John Walton
T he debt crisis has devas-tated the labor move-ment in Latin America.Austerity policies havecrippled the region'sliving standards, particu-
larly those of the popular classes.
With no end in sight, the debt
crisis has undermined the develop-
mental hopes of these people and
their institutional representa-
tives-hopes that once defined
Latin America's social objectives.
Social Consequences
A central feature of the crisis is the
striking uniformity of "structural
adjustment" policies in debtor
nations. Under the aegis of the
International Monetary Fund,
structural adjustment involves a
package of austerity measures:
currency devaluation, increased
interest rates, decreased imports,
lessened regulation of foreign in-
vestors, privatization of state-
owned firms, and above all,
reduced government subsidies for
food, transportation, petroleum
products, education, and health
services. This package is intended
to create "market-driven" econo-
mies that generate income for
debt servicing.
Yet, according to the UN Con-
ference on Trade and Develop-
ment, structural adjustment is
leading to economic stagnation in
Latin America and elsewhere in
the Third World, and is accelerat-
ing the transfer of income from
John Walton is professor of sociology
at the University of California, Davis.
He is completing a book, Cities in
Revolt, with David Seddon.
poor nations to developed ones.
The middle and lower classes-
especially the urban poor-are suf-
fering the heaviest burden of debt
servicing. Cuts in government
spending mean decreased earn-
ings and job losses for state
employees, as well as reduced
food and transportation subsidies
for the urban poor. The sale or
closure of state firms also elimi-
nates jobs, while import restric-
tions hurt small commercial firms
and national industries that
depend on foreign equipment.
Debt and Labor
The debt crisis has undercut the
institutional power and living stan-
dards of Latin American labor.
These losses are evident in the
magnitude of the regionwide
decline in real wages and corre-
sponding rise in both unemploy-
ment and underemployment; ac-
cording to the Inter-American
Development Bank, "informal"
jobs have become the only employ-
ment alternative for growing num-
bers of Latin Americans. Labor's
losses are also evident in drastic
reductions in the welfare benefits
previously won by unions, includ-
ing major cuts in real per capita
expenditures on state health and
education programs.
Besides imposing heavier bur-
dens on Latin America's lower
and middle classes, the drop in
living standards undermines the
ability of labor unions to effective-
ly represent workers, as reflected
in organized labor's diminished
legitimacy, internal divisions, and
chastened militancy. For instance,
labor analyst Edward Epstein ob-
serves that the higher the rate of
unemployment and the more
repressive the policies of govern-
ments, the fewer the number of
strikes and strikers in Latin Amer-
ican countries. In this respect the
debt crisis and austerity measures
have created a political climate
favorable to government assaults
on organized labor, as demon-
strated in cases such as Argentina
under Carlos Menem, Bolivia
under Jaime Paz Zamora, and
Mexico under Carlos Salinas de
Gortari. After reviewing several
examples of state-labor conflict in
Latin America during the 1980s,
British scholar Ian Roxborough
concludes that, while each state at-
tempted alternately to divide polit-
ically the unions and forge a new
social pact, "the general story is
one of 'muddling through' rather
than of a clear strategic plan ...
As the effects of the economic
crisis have bitten deeper into the
working class, labor's capacity to
respond has also diminished."
A related trend is that the com-
bination of debt, austerity, and
economic restructuring has
reshaped the social basis of the
political arena to the disadvantage
of organized labor. On the one
hand, the expansion of informal
employment and the weakened
political clout of unions reduce
the size of organized labor's follow-
ing. On the other hand, the key
issues of the last decade and the
foreseeable future center on the
politics of consumption-access to
housing, transportation, educa-
tion, and health care-rather than
the politics of production, the tradi-
tional focus of organized labor.
"Workplace" issues have not disap-
peared from Latin America's
political arena, but they tend to
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generate less mobilization than,
and to overlap only partially with,
matters like subsidy cuts, price in-
creases, and service reductions.
Meanwhile the economic, social,
and political conditions associated
with debt and austerity have given
rise to new forms of popular or-
ganization and action, including
religious base communities, barrio
associations, coordinadoras (na-
tional networks of regional and
local grassroots groups), and
protests (e.g., paros civicos, demon-
strations, general strikes, riots,
and looting).
Is Organized Labor Irrelevant?
The trend of domestic politics in
Latin America involves increasing
popular movements, eroding elec-
toral support for traditionally
dominant parties (even of the
putative left), and declining labor
union influence. The political role
of organized labor, however, has
differed from country to country.
In countries like Peru, Ecuador,
and Bolivia, organized labor has
been the principal agent of aus-
terity protest, particularly in the
form of general strikes that ally
workers with students, public
employees, and middle-class mer-
chants and consumers. More
generally, comparative findings
link levels of urbanization and
unionization to variation in the oc-
currence and severity of austerity
protest. Paradoxically, organized
labor has been both a key element
in causing austerity protest and, if
the evidence is correct, a reluctant
or opportunistic follower of
popular initiative.
Latin America's political future
is uncertain. It combines state
austerity policies with instances of
energetic popular organization.
The political direction of the
1990s depends on whether the
managers of structural adjustment
prevail, or whether labor and
neighborhood organizations as
well as other local movements
form a representative and effec-
tive alliance. International models
are available for either course-
from Mexico's Partido Revolu-
cionario Institucional to Poland's
Solidarity. The question for organ-
ized labor is whether it will follow
the well-worn paths of patronage
or build an independent, demo-
cratic social movement. m
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El Pacto: There They Go Again!
by David Barkin
ow short are our collec-
tive memories! Mexico's
stabilization efforts of
1987-90 are reminiscent
of its tripartite pact be-
tween labor, business,
and government during World
War II. Its purpose was to
restrain wage and price increases
"so as not to damage wartime
production." In a private
telegram to Washington, the US
ambassador of that moment,
George S. Messersmith, pleaded
for emergency shipments of corn
to Mexico, writing that: "[in spite
of the industrial boom] I have not
been so pessimistic with regard to
the outlook here at any time since
I came to Mexico as I am now.
The cost of living has gone up
tremendously. We are living really
on a social volcano here now. The
situation of the workers is intoler-
able for everything they eat has
gone up enormously and wage in-
creases do not seem to help for
the price controls have been inade-
quate" (quoted in Stephen Niblo,
"The Impact of War: Mexico and
World War II," 1988).
Mexican collaboration with the
war effort consisted of the whole-
sale acceptance of American
demands to reorient production
to the needs of the US economy,
on terms established by the US
government. This reorientation
caused the major shortfall in food
David Barkin is professor of economics
at the Universidad Aut6noma Metro-
politana, in Xochimilco, Mexico City.
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production as US demands led
Mexico to switch almost one-
quarter of its maize land to oil,
edible seeds, and natural fibers for
export. This policy and US opposi-
tion to the shipment of corn to
meet Mexico's needs provoked
widespread domestic opposition.
Even before the war's end it was
clear Mexico had paid dearly for
increased economic activity: it had
granted extraordinary influence
to the US in reshaping the Mexi-
can economy and formulating its
future development policies. The
distribution of wealth became
much more regressive, setting an
unfortunate standard for the
decades to come.
Problems and Promises
In light of the wartime policy,
today's Pacto de Estabilidad y
Crecimiento Econ6mico (PECE) is
nothing novel. PECE promises to
reverse the economy's stagflation.
The administration of Carlos
Salinas de Gortari reassures Mexi-
cans that Brazil's failed Cruzado
Plan and Argentina's sorry experi-
ence are irrelevant. Even without
looking south, Mexico's austerity,
wage freezes, and inflation of the
1940s should instill serious doubts
about claims that it can resume
more equitable growth without
first reversing the recent increase
in income inequality and decline
in living standards. During the
early 1940s real wages plunged by
more than 50% and did not
recover until 1971.
The mainstays of PECE are
wage and selective price controls
and a drastic reduction in govern-
ment spending, especially for
social services. Such austerity
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imposes a disproportionate bur-
den on the working classes, whose
share of national income had al-
ready fallen from 36% in the
mid-1970s to 25% in 1987. Open
unemployment is rising and pro-
duction for the domestic market is
shrinking due to price controls,
gutted tariff barriers, and tum-
bling purchasing power: real
wages are now lower than those
of the late 1930s.
PECE identifies inflation as the
major economic problem and the
rekindling of growth as the prin-
cipal objective. The government
accepts responsibility for much of
the recent inflation, asserting that
it results from sizable budgetary
deficits. Officials fail to point out,
however, that these deficits arose
from the state's inability to tax the
incomes of the small but politically
powerful group of rich Mexicans
who control most of the country's
wealth. Consequently the state
had to finance massive investment
programs and modest social wel-
fare programs with inflationary
measures such as foreign borrow-
ing. Despite the avarice of the
wealthy, the Salinas administra-
tion's programs continue to sub-
sidize their investments in the
hopes of spurring economic devel-
opment, while allowing and even
financing massive capital flight by
these same people.
Even as the administration has
hiked revenues and cut costs, the
inherited imbalances continue.
On the revenue-boosting and cost-
saving side, policymakers have in-
creased the value-added tax, im-
proved tax collection, imposed
some levies on profits, augmented
prices for public-firm goods and
services, and closed or sold some
public firms. Yet servicing the
debt forces the government to
borrow additional money, increas-
ingly from domestic lenders as
foreign banks seek to limit their
exposure. Since 1980 the internal
debt in pesos has swelled by 350%
to more than $50 billion--equal to
nearly half the foreign debt. But
since domestic interest rates are
three or four times higher than
international rates, the cost of ser-
vicing peso obligations is twice as
large as that of the foreign debt.
Mexico's internal debt offers juicy
compensation for support of
government policy by the wealthy.
Nevertheless, it is an exorbitant
price to pay for the inflow of
foreign capital required to sustain
the rest of the economic stabiliza-
tion package.
Policymakers say this package is
necessary to curb inflation and set
Mexico on the path to recovery.
Superficially they are correct. By
substantially reducing the budget
deficit as a percentage of the na-
tional product, the Salinas team
has slashed inflation from its sear-
ing pace of 1987-88 to its tranquil
level of a decade ago. And the rate
of economic growth doubled in
1989, to about equal with the rate
of population growth.
The technocrats claim this
scenario is boosting the con-
fidence of domestic and foreign
business in the government's
ability to manage the economy.
They argue that, along with the
opening up of Mexico to interna-
tional competition, such confi-
dence will stimulate private invest-
ment and create a more efficient
productive apparatus. They insist
that this apparatus will enable
Mexico to compete successfully in
world markets and provide im-
proved goods at more attractive
prices to Mexican consumers.
Indeed, the private sector has
responded with a surge in non-
traditional exports such as auto
parts, but foreign competition and
price controls have restricted
Mexico's traditionally important
generator of employment: produc-
tion of goods for the domestic
market. This downward trend in-
cludes the sharp decline in pro-
duction of basic crops by small
farmers because food imports
have reached record levels. Open-
ing the border to a flood of con-
sumer durables and food imports
has resulted in a drain on foreign
exchange, and only the wealthy
have reaped the benefits of the
Salinas administration's policy.
The Present Danger
Contrary to the official view, infla-
tion is not the most serious of
Mexico's ills nor is its control the
key to economic recovery. As ex-
port production is booming, the
domestic market is in the throes of
depression. The reasons are the
large-scale decline of the popula-
tion's purchasing power, the
shrinking private investment in
production for the internal mar-
ket, and the allocation of govern-
ment spending away from social
services and infrastructure. For
most Mexicans, PECE is driving a
set of nails into their coffins.
The danger of ignoring this
problem is a lesson that should
have been learned from Mexico's
experience during World War II.
Once again producers are re-
sponding with zeal to the govern-
ment's changing signals and incen-
tives. Unlike the earlier epoch,
domestic shortfalls in basic foods,
raw materials, and industrial
products can be readily supple-
mented by imports-for those
who can afford them. With the
advent of liberalized foreign
trade, imported consumer goods
are crowding the shelves of up-
scale stores.
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But the livelihood of the
majority of Mexican producers
and workers depends on the erod-
ing domestic market. Linked to
this erosion is the disappearance
of jobs and the development of
new family survival strategies. "In-
vented" jobs are burgeoning as
people attempt to find niches as
itinerant merchants and informal
suppliers of assorted services,
while national chains counter-
attack with marketing strategies
targeted at the shrinking middle
and upper classes. Also geared to
the latter groups are expanding
financial services, as people with
savings are taking advantage of
high returns in Mexico's banking
system and stock market, as well
as speculating in construction.
An Alternative Road
Ironically Mexico's suffering on
this account is needless. The fun-
damental obstacle to prosperity is
the official definition of the crisis
as a financial problem. This per-
spective leads to a search for new
ways to restructure the debt, gen-
erate foreign exchange, and re-
duce government spending. Thus
authorities reject approaches that
incorporate small producers; in-
stead they favor export industries
using the latest technologies.
Policymakers seem impervious
to the claim that Mexico could be
enjoying a thriving internal
market. In the countryside, idle
productive resources in the hands
of small farmers could eliminate
more than $3.5 billion in food im-
ports and create upwards of two
million jobs in a short time. In the
cities, idle light-industrial capacity
could be mobilized to produce
consumer goods, construction
materials, and light machinery to
supply a reinvigorated domestic
market and employ many addi-
tional workers.
Such an alternative would re-
quire the reintegration of small
farmers into the main stage of the
national economy. By offering
farmers remunerative prices for
their labor, the government could
induce them to bring their lands
back into commercial production
and enable Mexico to regain food
self-sufficiency. In turn, this pro-
cess would stimulate rural de-
mand for goods and services from
the rest of the economy, thereby
benefiting every social group in
Mexico. The country's balance of
payments and budget would both
improve. Although this approach
would raise consumer prices, the
cost would be small indeed com-
pared to the prosperity that the
strategy would generate. Specific
programs for the needy would be
less costly than current commod-
ity support programs.
What are the objections to such
an apparently simple and inexpen-
sive program? Some argue that
Mexico, including its small
farmers, have lost their ability to
produce basic food crops in the
volume required for national self-
sufficiency. Others are frankly
apprehensive about the political
implications of offering the small
farmers an opportunity to earn
the minimum wage. But such ob-
jections are misplaced: available
land already in the hands of small
producers, combined with the in-
creased yields possible with exist-
ing technologies and available
resources, could assure important
production increases in a very
short time. Political barriers are
more significant: some political
bosses would find their hegemony
threatened as their former clients
gained greater autonomy. By
facilitating this autonomy the
political monopoly of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional might
be threatened, especially if the
small farmers felt the new pro-
gram was won in the face of the
party's opposition.
PECE does not even permit
consideration of such an alterna-
tive. It focuses on inflation and
deceives people into thinking that
other ills can be corrected by mini-
mizing price increases. Reducing
inflation by deepening the coun-
try's depression will merely create
further problems. What is needed
is a reorientation of thinking
about the roots of, and solutions
to, the economic crisis. The crisis
can only be overcome by mobiliz-
ing the productive potential of the
Mexican people.
This alternative strategy does
not directly challenge the current
export-oriented approach. Mexico
has the resources to continue in-
creasing its production for export
while broadening its economy to
incorporate once again basic food
production. The alternative
strategy offers essential benefits to
millions of small farmers and
rural and urban workers whose
job opportunities have become
precarious and incomes have been
seriously eroded. It would also ac-
celerate the incipient process of
political democratization. As such
the strategy might be threatening
to those who benefit most from
the concentrated power and
wealth that characterizes the reign-
ing neoliberal approach.
All groups in Mexico would
have higher incomes if the alterna-
tive approach were implemented.
Mexico has the potential to both
boost its exports and reclaim its
domestic market. Why then must
its leaders continue repeating the
mistakes of past decades? .
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Bolivia's Perestroika?
by Eduardo A. Gamarra
n the mid-1980s Bolivia held
the dubious record of
26,000% inflation, the worst
ever in Latin America and the
seventh highest in recorded
history. With the August 1985
ascension of Victor Paz Estenssoro
to the presidency, Bolivia experi-
enced a dramatic restructuring of
its political economy. By June
1986 a comprehensive austerity
program, dubbed the Nueva
Politica Econdmica (NPE), reduced
inflation to 10% and, at least ac-
cording to government officials,
established the foundation for eco-
nomic recovery. The transforma-
tion of Bolivia's political economy
was so profound that loyalists in
Paz Estenssoro's Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)
proudly labeled it Bolivia's peres-
troika. Even the cautious London
Economist called the recovery "the
Bolivian Miracle."
Many international officials con-
sider Bolivia's NPE to be the only
successful austerity program in
Latin America. For Washington,
Bolivia has become a showcase of
democracy and an example of
what other nations in the region
could accomplish if they adopted
the "correct" free-market policies.
Domestically Bolivia has estab-
lished a new political consensus
around the NPE's premises. Al-
though Paz Estenssoro and MNR
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no longer rule Bolivia, his suc-
cesor, Jaime Paz Zamora of the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucio-
naria, has steadfastly stayed the
course since taking office in
August 1989.
To put this situation in context,
it is worthwhile to recall that Paz
Estenssoro and his MNR led
Bolivia's 1952 revolution. He and
MNR presided over the national-
ization of the country's tin in-
dustry, a broad-based agrarian
reform program, the enactment of
universal suffrage, and the down-
grading of the military. More sig-
nificant, they initiated a process of
state-led economic development
that lasted until 1985.
In November 1964 a military
coup replaced 12 years of MNR
rule with 18 years of military
dominance over Bolivian political
life. Most military governments,
however, followed (with US
backing) MNR's state-led develop-
ment strategy. Responding to
domestic and US pressure and to
imminent economic collapse, the
Bolivian military attempted an or-
derly withdrawal from the politi-
cal arena in the late 1970s. Only
after a tumultuous four-year
period of transition plagued by
coups, countercoups, and aborted
elections was civilian rule
achieved. In October 1982 when
Hernin Siles Zuazo, one of
MNR's founders, was sworn into
office, Bolivia was already experi-
encing the worst political and eco-
nomic crisis of its history. During
a hapless three-year period, Siles
was incapable of controlling or
satisfying demands from social
groups and was largely respon-
sible for precipitating Bolivia's
record hyperinflation.
Austerity Begins
On August 29, 1985, Siles's succes-
sor, Paz Estenssoro, surprised
MNR and the leftist groups that
had supported his election by an-
nouncing the NPE austerity pro-
gram. The NPE represented a
dramatic restructuring of the
development strategy established
33 years earlier by Paz Estenssoro
and MNR. It sought three objec-
tives: the liberalization of the
economy, the ascendance of the
private sector as the central actor
in economic development, and
the recuperation of state control
over key state enterprises. The
latter included the Corporacidn
Minera de Bolivia, which had been
appropriated by the Federacidn
Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de
Bolivia, the backbone of the
Central Obrera Boliviana (COB),
Bolivia's powerful labor confedera-
tion.
Through general strikes that
paralyzed the nation, COB had
sabotaged every attempt by the
Siles government to impose aus-
terity. In the process, however, it
eroded the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of strikes and other forms of
union protest. Thus, when Paz
Estenssoro's new MNR govern-
ment fired 22,000 mineworkers,
COB could barely muster enough
support to call a general strike.
Once capable of bringing down
governments, COB was reduced
to weak defensive actions to
prevent the imposition of even
harsher measures.
Bolstering the NPE's credibility
was the presence of Harvard
economist Jeffrey Sachs, who be-
came the government's principal
adviser. Aided by several Bolivian
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economists, Sachs put forth neo-
liberal recommendations aimed at
stabilizing the economy and end-
ing hyperinflation through a
shock therapy of reducing fiscal
deficits, freezing wages and sala-
ries, devaluing the currency, and
drastically cutting public-sector
employment. The government
also announced privatization and
similar measures.
A key to the NPE's success was
exchange rate stabilization.
Through liberalization of the
foreign exchange market and the
establishment of a bolsin (auction
mechanism) in the Banco Central,
the black market for dollars came
The Bolivian government
pioneered innovative schemes to
reduce its foreign debt. For ex-
ample, in 1988 it established a
debt-for-nature swap under an ar-
rangement with Citicorp and Con-
servation International. In 1989
Bolivia, funded by aid from
several nations, purchased $300
million of its private debt through
IMF-mediated channels. Such ac-
complishments impressed interna-
tional donors. Bolivia is now the
third largest US aid recipient in
Latin America, after El Salvador
and Honduras, as well as Latin
America's highest per capita recip-
ient of laDanese aid.
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proceeded at a snail's pace. The
collapse of the tin market and the
decline in the price of natural
gas-the nation's only sources of
hard currency-threatened to un-
dermine the government's pro-
gram. Even when faced with a
severe recession and soaring un-
employment, Paz Estenssoro
refused to alter the NPE guide-
lines. His tenacity was finally
rewarded in 1987 as the economy
grew for the first time in the
decade, and continued growing,
with inflation stabilizing at 20%
per year.
uraaN~rnprrmmmu num'"rIr
At the heart of the NPE's success
was the government's ability to
neutralize opposition from labor
and political parties in congress.
A so-called Pacto por la Democracia
between the ruling MNR and
former dictator General Hugo
Banzer Suirez's Accidn Democrdtica
y Nacionalista (ADN) guaranteed a
political base for the government's
policy. For the next three years
Paz Estenssoro used the pact to im-
pose three congressionally sanc-
tioned states of siege that dealt
Bolivian labor a severe blow, from
which it has yet to recover. For in-
stance, in September 1985 hun-
dreds of labor leaders, including
COB leader Juan Lechin, were ar-
rested and banished to remote
jungle towns. With absolute con-
trol over congress, the executive
imposed NPE-related legislation,
such as a new tax code, that con-
solidated the policy of economic
restructuring.
Although the pact broke down
during the 1989 election cam-
paign, its three-year tenure
revealed that the success of
austerity policies in Bolivia (and
elsewhere) is related directly to
the capacitv of overnments to es-
' - - maintain stable coali-
the Bolivians have
is lesson was demon-
new president Paz
social democrat, who
to the Acuerdo Patridtico
r's ADN before assum-
n August 1989. Like the
Democracia, the new al-
enabled the executive
control opposition from
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teachers.
tism may have replaced
Bolivia, but the rota-
e patronage among
fitter rivals is the under-
for short-term stability.
>atronage can guarantee
the long-term stability of the NPE
and Bolivian democracy is ques-
tionable.
An Exportable Cure?
The NPE's effectiveness is fragile,
and its impact varies by economic
sector and social class. To begin
with, the health of the Bolivian
economy is tied to the export of
natural gas to Argentina. Yet Ar-
gentina has not met its payments
on time, and economic reactiva-
tion in Bolivia has been severely
hampered by chronic delays.
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Reports: Austerity
Bolivia's Perestroika?
by Eduardo A. Gamarra
n the mid-1980s Bolivia held
the dubious record of
26,000% inflation, the worst
ever in Latin America and the
seventh highest in recorded
history. With the August 1985
ascension of Victor Paz Estenssoro
to the presidency, Bolivia experi-
enced a dramatic restructuring of
its political economy. By.
1986 a comprehensive at
program, dubbed the Nu
Politica Econdmica (NPE),
inflation to 10% and, at 14
cording to government o
established the foundatic
nomic recovery. The trar
tion of Bolivia's political 4
was so profound that loy;
Paz Estenssoro's Movimie,
Nacionalista Revolucionarie
proudly labeled it Bolivia
troika. Even the cautious
Economist called the recoN
Bolivian Miracle."
Many international off
sider Bolivia's NPE to be
successful austerity progi
Latin America. For Wash
Bolivia has become a sho
democracy and an exam l
what other nations in the
could accomplish if they adopted
the "correct" free-market policies.
Domestically Bolivia has estab-
lished a new political consensus
around the NPE's premises. Al-
though Paz Estenssoro and MNR
Eduardo A. Gamarra is assistant
professor of political science at Florida
International University and an asso-
ciate editor of Hemisphere. He is the
co-author (with James M. Malloy) of
Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia
1964-1985 (Transaction Books, 1988).
no longer rule Bolivia, his suc-
cesor, Jaime Paz Zamora of the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucio-
naria, has steadfastly stayed the
course since taking office in
August 1989.
To put this situation in context,
it is worthwhile to recall that Paz
Estenssoro and his MNR led
Austerity Begins
On August 29, 1985, Siles's succes-
sor, Paz Estenssoro, surprised
MNR and the leftist groups that
had supported his election by an-
nouncing the NPE austerity pro-
gram. The NPE represented a
dramatic restructuring of the
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after a tumultuous four-year
period of transition plagued by
coups, countercoups, and aborted
elections was civilian rule
achieved. In October 1982 when
Hernin Siles Zuazo, one of
MNR's founders, was sworn into
office, Bolivia was already experi-
encing the worst political and eco-
nomic crisis of its history. During
a hapless three-year period, Siles
was incapable of controlling or
satisfying demands from social
groups and was largely respon-
sible for precipitating Bolivia's
record hyperinflation.
-- ----- --- ------ - ---- ---- -- 0--
macy of strikes and other forms of
union protest. Thus, when Paz
Estenssoro's new MNR govern-
ment fired 22,000 mineworkers,
COB could barely muster enough
support to call a general strike.
Once capable of bringing down
governments, COB was reduced
to weak defensive actions to
prevent the imposition of even
harsher measures.
Bolstering the NPE's credibility
was the presence of Harvard
economist Jeffrey Sachs, who be-
came the government's principal
adviser. Aided by several Bolivian
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economists, Sachs put forth neo-
liberal recommendations aimed at
stabilizing the economy and end-
ing hyperinflation through a
shock therapy of reducing fiscal
deficits, freezing wages and sala-
ries, devaluing the currency, and
drastically cutting public-sector
employment. The government
also announced privatization and
similar measures.
A key to the NPE's success was
exchange rate stabilization.
Through liberalization of the
foreign exchange market and the
establishment of a bolsin (auction
mechanism) in the Banco Central,
the black market for dollars came
to a grinding halt. Critics point
out, however, that the bolsin also
created a means for laundering
"narcodollars," profits from the
cocaine industry.
Most analysts argue that the
NPE revealed Paz Estenssoro's
abandonment of the 1952 revolu-
tion's goals. Arguably, however,
the NPE reflected less a reversal of
the system of political economy
linked to Paz Estenssoro and
MNR than an adaptation of the
original revolution to a new set of
realities. For Paz Estenssoro and
his economic advisers, state capi-
talism had reached its final limits.
Shortly after launching the aus-
terity plan, Paz Estenssoro
claimed the NPE flowed directly
out of his original approach to
revolutionary change.
Yet Bolivia's economic recovery
proceeded at a snail's pace. The
collapse of the tin market and the
decline in the price of natural
gas-the nation's only sources of
hard currency-threatened to un-
dermine the government's pro-
gram. Even when faced with a
severe recession and soaring un-
employment, Paz Estenssoro
refused to alter the NPE guide-
lines. His tenacity was finally
rewarded in 1987 as the economy
grew for the first time in the
decade, and continued growing,
with inflation stabilizing at 20%
per year.
The Bolivian government
pioneered innovative schemes to
reduce its foreign debt. For ex-
ample, in 1988 it established a
debt-for-nature swap under an ar-
rangement with Citicorp and Con-
servation International. In 1989
Bolivia, funded by aid from
several nations, purchased $300
million of its private debt through
IMF-mediated channels. Such ac-
complishments impressed interna-
tional donors. Bolivia is now the
third largest US aid recipient in
Latin America, after El Salvador
and Honduras, as well as Latin
America's highest per capita recip-
ient of Japanese aid.
Implementing Austerity
At the heart of the NPE's success
was the government's ability to
neutralize opposition from labor
and political parties in congress.
A so-called Pacto por la Democracia
between the ruling MNR and
former dictator General Hugo
Banzer Suarez's Acci6n Democrdtica
y Nacionalista (ADN) guaranteed a
political base for the government's
policy. For the next three years
Paz Estenssoro used the pact to im-
pose three congressionally sanc-
tioned states of siege that dealt
Bolivian labor a severe blow, from
which it has yet to recover. For in-
stance, in September 1985 hun-
dreds of labor leaders, including
COB leader Juan Lechin, were ar-
rested and banished to remote
jungle towns. With absolute con-
trol over congress, the executive
imposed NPE-related legislation,
such as a new tax code, that con-
solidated the policy of economic
restructuring.
Although the pact broke down
during the 1989 election cam-
paign, its three-year tenure
revealed that the success of
austerity policies in Bolivia (and
elsewhere) is related directly to
the capacity of governments to es-
tablish and maintain stable coali-
tions. That the Bolivians have
learned this lesson was demon-
strated by new president Paz
Zamora, a social democrat, who
entered into the Acuerdo Patri6tico
with Banzer's ADN before assum-
ing office in August 1989. Like the
Pacto por la Democracia, the new al-
liance has enabled the executive
branch to control opposition from
labor and political parties in con-
gress and to press ahead with the
NPE. In November 1989 Paz
Zamora imposed a state of siege,
arresting and banishing hundreds
of striking teachers.
Pragmatism may have replaced
ideology in Bolivia, but the rota-
tion of state patronage among
formerly bitter rivals is the under-
lying basis for short-term stability.
Whether patronage can guarantee
the long-term stability of the NPE
and Bolivian democracy is ques-
tionable.
An Exportable Cure?
The NPE's effectiveness is fragile,
and its impact varies by economic
sector and social class. To begin
with, the health of the Bolivian
economy is tied to the export of
natural gas to Argentina. Yet Ar-
gentina has not met its payments
on time, and economic reactiva-
tion in Bolivia has been severely
hampered by chronic delays.
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Several economists argue that
the health of the Bolivian econ-
omy is also tied to the revenues
from the booming cocaine trade.
Other economists note that the im-
pact of the drug trade is less than
speculated. In any case, Bolivia
has not found a legitimate way to
tap into this industry and must ex-
ercise great caution so as not to
stir the wrath of Washington's war
on drugs.
Meanwhile Bolivian industry,
construction, and mining have not
fully recovered. Commerce, espe-
cially the import-export sector, is
the only profitable venture. But
with booming contraband,
prominent entrepreneurs have
demanded substantial changes in
the NPE tariff policies to protect
them from foreign competition
and bankruptcy. Indications are
that President Paz Zamora will
yield to these pressures.
Socioeconomic indicators also
reveal the slow pace and tenuous
nature of recovery. Unemploy-
ment stands at 20%, salaries
remain extremely low, and prices
for most products are out of reach
for the majority of Bolivians.
The potential loss of jobs by
members of a transformed sector
of the labor movement presents
the most serious domestic chal-
lenge to the NPE. After searching
in vain for employment, thou-
sands of Bolivia's displaced miners
migrated to the Cochabamba val-
leys to grow coca leaf. After rees-
tablishing unions, they emerged
as the most powerful sector of or-
ganized labor. This development
poses major problems for the
Bolivian government, which has
attempted to comply with coca
eradication agreements with the
US. If the government attempts to
forcefully "relocate" this sector
one more time into the ranks of
the unemployed, growing ten-
sions could erupt into an explo-
sive confrontation.
Despite these negative portents,
Bolivia has become a "model" of
stable governance and sound
economic management. But opti-
mism about the model's export-
ability must be tempered by two
considerations. First, the smallness
of the Bolivian economy made sta-
bilization possible with relatively
small amounts of capital. Second,
the particularities of Bolivia's so-
cial and political structure enabled
the NPE's advocates to defeat
their opponents, especially the
labor movement. At least for now,
the NPE's shock therapy has stabi-
lized the Bolivian economy, but
the cost is apparently much
higher than what its neighboring
governments are either willing or
able to impose on their people. .
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Reports: Environment
costa Kica Resource Challenges
by Lori Ann Thrupp
ith a remarkable
27% of its national
territory protected
in national parks
and in forest, bio-
logical, and Indian
reserves, Costa Rica is widely con-
sidered a successful model for en-
vironmental policy. Among its
most effective conservation initia-
tives are fiscal incentives for
reforestation and debt-for-nature
swaps, where international envi-
ronmental organizations absorb
small portions of the foreign debt
in exchange for the maintenance
of parks or reserves. The nation's
environmental laws, whose reach
extends from pesticide use to
waste disposal, are elaborate and
ambitious in principle. Its univer-
sities and US-linked research insti-
tutes, such as the Organization for
Tropical Studies, are addressing
environmental issues on a grow-
ing scale. Moreover, Costa Rican
"ecotourism" has blossomed into a
multimillion-dollar business.
Costa Rica's long-standing ef-
forts are indeed significant. Yet a
deeper look into its environmental
problems and policies raises fun-
damental questions: How effective
are the country's conservation ini-
tiatives and groups? And are they
confronting its most urgent
problems?
Lori Ann Thrupp is a postdoctoral fel-
low with the Energy and Resources
Group at the University of California,
Berkeley. Her publications include
"Pesticides and Policies: Approaches to
Pest-Control Dilemmas in Nicaragua
and Costa Rica, " Latin American
Perspectives (1988).
Impacts, Impediments,
Weaknesses
In spite of the country's efforts,
the degradation of Costa Rican
resources is worse than ever.
Deforestation occurs at the rate of
50,000 hectares per year, far
beyond the 3,000 hectares that are
annually reforested. Meanwhile a
host of problems, including water-
shed degradation, soil erosion,
water and air pollution, over-
fishing, sanitation and waste
problems, and pesticide damage,
results in rising economic losses
for rural and urban Costa Ricans.
Costa Rica's poor bear a dis-
proportionate share of the envi-
ronmental burden. For instance,
those peasants who are being dis-
placed to marginal lands and can
least afford fertilizers are the prin-
cipal victims of deteriorating soils.
Similarly those people who reside
in the growing informal settle-
ments of urban areas are the main
victims of inadequate sanitation.
A principal reason for the wor-
sening of environmental problems
is that the state's policies do not
directly address their causes. The
fundamental causes of resource
degradation in Costa Rica, as in
most countries, are political-
economic forces rooted in the
wider international market. The
Costa Rican economy revolves
around the export of coffee and
bananas, followed by beef and
sugar, in exchange for manufac-
tured goods from the US and
other developed countries. Costa
Rica's trade dependence has com-
bined with a chronic fiscal deficit
to generate one of the world's
highest per capita foreign debts.
Given regionwide economic crisis
and the strings attached to the
flow of aid, the US and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund have
pushed the Costa Rican state to
implement the twin policies of
domestic austerity and nontradi-
tional export promotion.
Costa Rica has substantially in-
creased the value of its nontra-
ditional exports (e.g., palm oil,
tropical fruits), yet this structural
adjustment strategy has led to aug-
mented imports of cereal to feed
the nation's population, and has
contributed to worsened rural and
urban socioeconomic inequality.
Moreover the adjustment strategy
has exacerbated the trade deficit
and aggravated pressures on
natural resources. From an envi-
ronmental standpoint, the nexus
between the Costa Rican and
world political economy impedes
local attempts to promote sustain-
able development.
Against this backdrop the
nation's environmental policies
tend to be ad hoc responses to
emergencies rather than cohesive
efforts at prevention. For one
thing, government agencies are
commonly pitted against each
other in turf battles. For example,
while the Ministerio de Agricultura
encourages farmers to clear more
land and produce more food, the
Direccidn Forestal admonishes them
to plant trees, not crops. The ab-
sence of coordination extends to
nongovernment organizations as
well.
Another dimension of ad hoc
policy is that, though Costa Rica
has thousands of pages of environ-
mental laws, most of these are
weak and unenforceable. Among
the reasons are the political con-
straints of debt and austerity,
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which restrict the state's monitor-
ing capacity while they pressure it
to stimulate economic growth.
Conservation initiatives, such as
Direccidn Forestal's tree planting
programs, suffer from poor main-
tenance; and lacking alternatives
and despite laws to the contrary,
squatters and colonists continue to
deforest public and private lands.
Meanwhile environmental
regulations often contradict state
incentives for economic develop-
ment. Thus reforestation efforts
clash with laws that enable people
to acquire title to land by "improv-
ing it" through farming and
deforestation. They also clash with
a measure that grants landowners
an income tax deduction of
$1,000 for each hectare refor-
ested. Besides its bias against mid-
dle and low-income rural people,
who do not pay income tax, the
measure subsidizes land specula-
tion by permitting entrepreneurs
to plant seedlings, receive the de-
duction, and then let the trees die.
Still another weakness stems
from the foreign models that form
the basis of Costa Rican policy.
Costa Rica emphasizes wilderness
protection-a move applauded by
mainstream North American and
European environmentalists-but
wildlife, tourism, and science re-
search are not interests of the
majority of Costa Ricans, who are
poor and neither have access to,
nor derive income from, these ac-
tivities. Although inequality of
landownership in Costa Rica is
not as extreme as elsewhere in
Central America, the problem is
nonetheless severe: 37% of land-
holders are small farmers who
own just 1% of all farmland, while
the top 1% of landholders own
more than 25% of the farmland.
Furthermore thousands of agricul-
tural workers are landless. In view
of the inequitable distribution of
landownership, the extent of pro-
tected area is perhaps excessive.
Given this agrarian structure,
the creation of parks or reserves
by wealthy individuals, such as the
acquisition of 50,000 hectares for
Guancaste Park by US biologist
Daniel Janzen, perpetuates inequi-
table development. This problem
includes the growth of foreign in-
fluence over local decisions and
resources. One aspect of foreign
influence is debt-for-nature swaps.
Such swaps alleviate only a minute
percentage of the external debt,
yet they favor the interests of
mainstream environmentalists at
the expense of the basic needs of
the rural poor.
Programs to induce the rural
poor to adopt environmental con-
servation have been ineffective.
They rarely involve participation
of the local people and are top-
down in approach. Among such
programs are Direccidn Forestal's
"demonstration" plots, which em-
phasize large-scale commercial
reforestation using exotic species.
This practice is usually impossible
for small farmers, mainly because
the size of their landholdings is in-
sufficient and must be devoted to
food crops.
The Direccidn Forestal has begun
some agroforestry projects that
are more suitable for the rural
poor, yet these projects often over-
look indigenous agroforestry prac-
tices and try (unsuccessfully) to
push methods developed in re-
search stations. In addition many
rural people oppose parks and
forest reserves and have little in-
terest in wilderness recreation.
Their stance is logical, since either
they lack farmland and resources
or, if they are landowners, they
are often left to deal with the
nuisance of wild animals from
reserves.
Implications
Costa Rica has given more atten-
tion to environmental problems
than many other developing
countries, yet the popular image
of Costa Rica as ecologically
progressive is somewhat illusory.
The country's fragile economy is
also aggravating pressures on the
deteriorating resource conditions.
There are no easy answers to
these problems. It is clear, how-
ever, that the social dimensions of
conservation cannot be ignored,
and that the political-economic
roots of the problems must be
directly confronted. The rural
poor deeply understand the value
of resources as seen from the
perspective of their basic needs.
The promotion of sustainable,
equitable development requires
that their interests be given
priority.
Among the needed transfor-
mations is the ending of state in-
centives and subsidies for large
cattle and timber enterprises,
along with state action to elimi-
nate land speculation in frontier
areas. Such measures must be
accompanied by land reform to
redistribute farmland and to trans-
fer some of the protected area
into agroforestry programs, as
well as state incentives and credit
for establishing agroforestry and
soil conservation. A related prior-
ity is the diversification of food
crops needed for feeding Costa
Ricans, and the cessation of the
environmentally and economically
deleterious emphasis on agricul-
tural exports.
Strategies of grassroots "em-
powerment" and democratic par-
ticipation are likewise vital, as is
the redirection of some funds
from parks and wildlife protection
to such strategies. Equally impor-
tant is the taking of initiative in
the US and other industrial
powers to eliminate problems
such as toxic substance exports
and investment patterns that ex-
ploit Third World labor and
resources.
There is potential for effective
change in Costa Rica if it can em-
phasize policies of social justice
and sustainable development. The
suggested reforms may sound in-
feasible and radical; yet until they
happen, rhetoric about solving en-
vironmental problems will remain
empty and superficial. .
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
No Sugar Daddy
Caribbean and Central American
sugar producers are watching
developments in the 1990 Farm
Bill debate in Washington. New
US policy on sugar imports will
emerge from these discussions.
Foreign producers and US inter-
ests such as the Sweetener Users
Association hope Congress will
lower price supports and reduce
import quotas. They have tough
opposition, however, including
Rep. Kika de la Garza (D-TX),
who chairs the House Agriculture
Committee. Speaking in Florida
in February 1990, the legislator
repudiated a ruling from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (June 9, 1989) that US
sugar import quotas are illegal.
Come Back to Jamaica
Ad agency Young & Rubicam
pleaded guilty to one count of con-
spiracy and paid a $500,000 fine
to settle a charge that it violated
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
to win a Jamaican Tourist Board
account. In exchange for the guil-
ty plea and fine, the Justice
Department dropped a federal
racketeering charge. After settling
the case, the agency's general
counsel gave his corporate "spin"
to the incident. According to the
Wall Street Journal (February 12,
1990), he stated that the charge
was "...the most metaphysical
felony that I've ever pleaded guil-
ty to."
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Watch Out
New Exchange of Information
Agreements between the US and
Peru and between the US and
Mexico have added to the worries
of US banks who fear losing wary
Latin American depositers. The
agreements mandate that the US
Internal Revenue Service and the
sister institutions of cooperating
governments exchange, upon
request, information concerning
taxes of a resident of either
country, including records
provided by financial institutions.
Already Barbados, Bermuda,
Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago are sig-
natories to the agreement. The
participation of Costa Rica,
Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, and
Panama is pending.
Caribbean Commission
A commission to examine the
future of Caribbean development
has been named and will be
housed on the Mona Campus of
the University of the West Indies
in Jamaica. The commission is
mandated by the Caribbean Com-
munity (CARICOM) to develop
the region's economic, political,
and cultural agendas for the 21st
century. Its report on Caribbean
economic integration and the im-
pact of Europe's unification must
be ready for the 1992 CARICOM
summit. Among its members are
Dame Nita Barrow of Barbados
and Vaughan Lewis of the Or-
ganization of Eastern Caribbean
States.
Montecristo at Risk
The Environmental Project on
Central America reports that El
Salvador's Montecristo Park is at
risk because of the Trifinio Plan to
develop the border area shared by
that country, Honduras, and
Guatemala (Greenpaper series, No.
4, p. 10). A habitat for the quetzal
because of its boundless cloud
forests, Montecristo has been sub-
ject to increasing pressure by
refugees and settlers fleeing the
ravages of the country's civil war.
In a rare instance of cooperation
among the neighboring countries,
the Trifinio Plan will allow "un-
regulated" agricultural, mining,
and timber development that will
"increase pressure on the park."
Capital Flow
Latin Finance's April 1990 edition
offers a thorough analysis of the
Eastern European challenge to
Latin America. Several viewpoints
amplify the growing debate on the
subject. Sir William Ryrie of the
International Finance Corpora-
tion reasons that Eastern Europe
may not pull investment away
from Latin America. Kissinger As-
sociates analyst Alan Stoga states
that the US needs to concentrate
its efforts first on Latin American
trade partners. A former World
Bank spokesperson, Frank Vogl,
asserts that a "double standard is
being applied that falls heavier on
the democracies of Latin America
than on the would be democracies
of Eastern Europe." Latin Finance,
a Euromoney magazine, is pub-
lished in Coral Gables, Florida.
a --
Buried in New York
While in Europe in early Febru-
ary, Mexican president Carlos
Salinas de Gortari pleaded with in-
dustrialized countries not to for-
get about Latin America in the
wake of new markets and invest-
ment opportunities in Eastern
Europe. In case you missed the
story, it was buried in the New
York Times's February 2, 1990,
Business Section, under the New
York Stock Exchange Bond Trad-
ing listings.
Streamer of Consciousness
Speaking at a military ceremony
in Fort Myer, Virginia, on March
8, 1990, President George Bush
stated "We're here to add another
campaign streamer to the roll call
of glory, the roster of great
American campaigns-Yorktown,
Gettysburg, Normandy and now
Panama." Streamers were at-
tached to the flags of the four US
military services, each represent-
ing a different war or military cam-
paign from the revolutionary war
to Grenada. Bush went on to say
that the new streamer was "most
of all" for the US soldiers killed in
Panama.
Saya not Lambada
While the lambada had Americans
and Europeans trying new contor-
tions to the tune of "Chorando se
foi," the Bolivian authors of the hit
sued Brazilian and French pro-
ducers for copyright violations.
Los Kjarkas, who composed
"Llorando se fue" with a Saya beat
from the Bolivian Yungas region,
reportedly settled for a meager
$260,000. Bolivian nationalism
has been fueled by cries that the
paltry sum added insult to the in-
jury of plagiarism.
A Degree of Change
In February 1990 Miami jour-
nalist Pablo Alfonso interviewed a
dissident law professor from
Cuba's Universidad de Camagiiey.
The professor outlined the grow-
ing restlessness among Cuba's in-
telligentsia and students. Par-
ticularly troublesome to Castro's
regime, he said, are Moscow-
trained Cuban social scientists
who understand and sympathize
with the need for glasnost and
perestroika. The 29-year-old
refugee capped his interview by
declaring that in Cuba "it's more
dangerous to have a degree from
Moscow than to have one from
Harvard."
Surf's Really Up
Lester Moreno, a 17-year-old
Cuban, had been riding the
island's waves for nine years. On
March 1, 1990, he caught the "big
one" that surfers dream about.
Carrying a backpack loaded with
fresh water and condensed milk,
he glided from Cuba's Varadero
Beach into an easterly wind that
pushed him and his sail board to
within 30 miles of Miami, where
he was plucked from the ocean by
the US Coast Guard.
E
On the Move
Ertha Pascal Trouillot is Haiti's
first woman president. Named to
succeed Lieutenant General
Prospero Avril, the former su-
preme court justice presides
over a 19-member council of state
as Haiti prepares for elections that
may be held in October 1990.
Heraldo Mufioz, one of Chile's
leading scholars, has been named
by the Aylwin government to be
Chile's ambassador to the Or-
ganization of American States in
Washington.
Newsday's Roy Gutman, who
authored Banana Diplomacy: The
Making of American Policy in
Nicaragua, 1981-1987 (Simon and
Schuster, 1988), left Washington
in December 1989 for East Ger-
many, where he serves as the
newspaper's bureau chief.
Geoff Pyatt, who served as a staff
assistant to the Inter-American
Dialogue, has joined the US
Foreign Service and is now the
third secretary of the economics
section of the US Embassy in
Honduras.
Marvin Carter, president of the As-
sociation of American Chambers
of Commerce in Latin America,
testified before the Congressional
Joint Economic Committee on
May 22, 1990. He suggested that
"most of Latin America has been a
victim of benign neglect and/or
crisis management by foreign
policymakers in both [US political]
parties."
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Democracy on a Tether
by Brian Loveman
tian Democrat Patricio
Aylwin took office as
Chile's first elected presi-
dent since 1970. Thus
ended the authoritarian
government of General Augusto
Pinochet (1973-90).
Aylwin's inauguration, sup-
ported by the ideologically diverse
Concertaci6n de Partidos pot la Demo-
cracia, represented the culmina-
tion of a process specified in the
Chilean constitution of 1980. In a
plebiscite held in October 1988,
voters rejected Pinochet's contin-
uation in office. Pinochet's defeat
initiated a period of transition in
which he would remain in office
until March 1990, with voters
electing a successor and a con-
gress on December 14, 1989. In
the meantime, Pinochet and the
opposition decided upon constitu-
tional reforms that were approved
in a July 1989 plebiscite.
Throughout 1989 there was
doubt as to whether Pinochet or
his hard-line supporters would
allow the scheduled elections, or
whether an opposition candidate
would be allowed to take office if
Brian Loveman, professor of political
science at San Diego State University,
is the author of Chile (2nd ed.;
Oxford University Press, 1988).
elected. The transition, the elec-
tion campaign, and the political
debates were colored by an aware-
ness that nothing could be taken
for granted and that the threat of
a preventive military coup or
government provocation could
never be entirely dismissed.
Yet Pinochet appeared to
believe that his historical role in
Chile, if unappreciated now,
would eventually be recognized: a
hero who had saved the country
from totalitarian communism,
reestablished law and order,
provided the constitutional foun-
dations of a modern democracy,
and permitted a peaceful, legal
transition from authoritarian rule
to elected government. This vision
may have seemed implausible to
the majority of Chileans, but, as
the events of 1989 and early 1990
unfolded, Pinochet could respond
to his detractors that the transi-
tion had gone as promised. After
all, the results of the plebiscite of
October 1988 were accepted-
even though on the night of Oc-
tober 5, 1988, Pinochet and a
small coterie in desperation con-
sidered suspending the vote
count. In addition constitutional
reforms were adopted in the plebi-
scite of July 1989, with prior con-
sultation and negotiations with
the opposition. The presidential
and congressional elections were
held, the votes fairly and quickly
counted, and the opposition can-
didate, Patricio Aylwin, declared
the victor.
Shortly after the elections,
Pinochet even invited Aylwin to
the presidential palace to discuss
the transition. Still, when Aylwin
suggested that Pinochet leave the
post of commander-in-chief of the
army-a position guaranteed to
him under the 1980 constitution-
upon stepping down as president,
Pinochet politely declined.
In short the transition occurred
as scheduled and a gradual loosen-
ing of authoritarian controls over
radio, television, the press, and
political activity was achieved. The
basic rules of political life, the
tutelary role of the military in
Chilean politics, and the nation's
economic model have, however,
remained strictly those of
Pinochet. Chile was moving from
a harsh authoritarian regime to a
"democracy on a tether"-a transi-
tion whose process and pace were
dictated by the Pinochet govern-
ment within a framework of
limited bargaining with the op-
position bloc. Thus the incoming
president and his policy advisers
faced a number of formidable con-
straints in further democratizing
Chilean politics and in taking im-
portant policy initiatives during
their first year in office.
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Pinochet's Legacies
The new political system installed
by the 1980 constitution, even as
modified by the 1989 reforms, was
inherently authoritarian, elitist,
and undemocratic. Appointed
senators, veto power over public
policy by a national security coun-
cil, and the permanent tutelary
role of the armed forces con-
strained the exercise of the
popular will through elected rep-
resentatives. Moreover the opposi-
tion that previously supported
Marxist or socialist institutions
and policies was emasculated or
temporized by the 16 years of offi-
cial terrorism and repression that
transformed Chile's state and
economy. Arguably Chilean
politics had been polarized and
ideological, and a dose of prag-
matism and reformism were essen-
tial for democracy to have a
chance. But the Aylwin coalition's
emphatic moderation represented
a powerful acknowledgement of
the tether General Pinochet fas-
tened upon the caballitos in his cor-
ral. Terror and repression had
brought results.
Pinochet forced most of the op-
position into a cautious and com-
promising mood regarding trial
or punishment of the armed
forces and security personnel guil-
ty of human rights abuses. Many
leading opposition leaders
preferred to downplay threats
against the military in exchange
for a peaceful transition, military
"neutrality," and a gradual depar-
ture of Pinochet from the scene.
Pinochet sought to further con-
strain the Aylwin coalition by
enacting institutional reforms and
"organic laws" in 1989 and early
1990. Among the key measures
were the creation of a relatively in-
dependent central bank with
broad economic and monetary
authority and limitations on the
public sector's size. They also in-
cluded tenure for government offi-
cials of the outgoing regime,
guarantees on military budget
levels, and a free hand in certain
policy and appointment matters
for the armed forces, as well as ac-
celerating privatization of public
enterprises. In these ways
Pinochet sought to leave the in-
coming administration, in his own
words, "todo atado y bien atado."
The challenge facing the Aylwin
administration is to maneuver
within the confines of the tether,
until it can be loosened or cut,
and to meet some of the pent-up
demands of those who struggled
against the Pinochet government.
The Military
Perhaps the most sensitive and dif-
ficult area for Aylwin's new gov-
ernment is its relations with the
military. Divisions emerged within
the armed forces over support for
Pinochet and some of his policies.
Nevertheless, most military of-
ficers continued to be proud of
their role in "saving Chile from
communism." They remained
committed to a tutelary role in the
future political system, protective
of their institutional and profes-
sional prerogatives, and generally
insistent on immunity from trial
or punishment for alleged abuses
perpetrated during the last 16
years.
In September 1989 the pattern
of military retirements and promo-
tions apparently reinforced
S
Pinochet's control and left his
loyalists in key command posi-
tions. Even moderates in the
armed forces insisted upon im-
plicit guarantees from the Aylwin
coalition that they would not be
targets of retaliation after March
1990, that defense policy would
not be politicized, and that force
levels and budgets would not be
drastically reduced.
These issues represent funda-
mental challenges to the unity of
the Aylwin coalition and to the
authentic democratization of
Chile. Many Aylwin supporters
once suffered repression or exile.
They represent groups that
demand "justice," if not revenge.
The transfer of resources from the
bloated military budget to long-
postponed programs of housing,
education, health, and nutrition is
an obvious way of meeting some
of their demands. Yet the risk of
offending military elites during
the first years of transition cannot
be ignored. It is difficult to im-
agine a stable democracy perma-
nently facing the military sword of
Damocles: a democracy condi-
tioned upon military approval of
key policy decisions or even in-
dividual judicial proceedings.
Thus civil-military relations pose
an immediate and critical dilem-
ma for the new government. This
dilemma was intensified shortly
after Aylwin's inauguration by an
assassination attempt on an ex-
member of the military junta, air
force general Gustavo Leigh.
The Political and Economic Right
Chile's political right was devas-
tated by the October 1988 plebi-
scite. Lacking alternative civilian
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or military leadership and disor-
ganized by 16 years of govern-
ment tutelage and internal lethar-
gy, the political right cannibalized
itself in 1989. The major rightist
parties-acknowledging their in-
ability to retain power without mil-
itary intervention-failed to agree
on a candidate to face Aylwin.
Hence, while expecting an Aylwin
victory in December 1989, they
scrambled to capture congression-
al and senatorial seats through the
gerrymandered election system
imposed by the regime.
Chile's economic right--a
heterogeneous, dynamic, and
highly visible force in the 1980s-
despaired at the agony of the
rightist political organizations.
The entrepreneurs feared a radi-
cal shift in macroeconomic and
sectorial policies if the Aylwin
coalition were victorious. In prin-
ciple the entrepreneurs were not
opposed to a limited degree of
political liberalization-as long as
it meant neither serious populist
pressures nor an end to the "labor
discipline" that had made possible
the impressive economic gains of
recent years-but they tended to
favor continuity without Pinochet.
They looked to Aylwin for reas-
surances that his victory would
not significantly threaten their
economic interests. The Aylwin
program, however, implied some-
what higher taxes, modest wage
and salary gains for labor, and an
ambiguous level of income redis-
tribution through government
programs.
The Aylwin Government
In January 1990 president-elect
Aylwin named a cabinet that con-
sisted of representatives from a
number of coalition parties and
widely respected intellectuals and
professionals. Aware of the
delicacy of the transition, Aylwin
and his advisors proceeded with
moderation and deliberation.
They sought to reassure all sectors
that the seemingly incompatible
objectives of satisfying labor,
entrepreneurs, human rights ac-
tivists, the military, and "la gente"
were feasible. The key, the Aylwin
team argued, was for Chileans to
allow the new government some
breathing space.
Much depends upon the con-
tinued expansion of the Chilean
economy. In 1988-89 it experi-
enced dynamic growth, led by ex-
ports of agricultural, forestry,
fishery, and mineral products. In
1989 the value of exports ex-
ceeded $8 billion, making Chile
the leading per capita exporter in
Latin America. Moreover a favor-
able balance of trade along with
debt-equity swaps and other incen-
tives to foreign investors enabled
Chile to reduce its foreign debt.
Significant inflows of foreign in-
vestment contributed to the diver-
sification of industry and the
expansion of the already booming
export sectors.
The elections of December
1989 focused attention on
Aylwin's economic program. The
new minister of finance, noted
economist Alejandro Foxley, has
reassured domestic entrepreneurs
and foreign investors that they
can expect continuity, with per-
haps some income redistribution
through social programs and mod-
erate tax reforms to generate in-
come for government programs.
GD PER CAPIT
Entrepreneurs, of course, are well
aware of the vital role of "labor dis-
cipline" and low salaries (the mini-
mum wage at the end of 1989 was
less than $60 per month) in
Chilean export competitiveness
and firm profitability. They there-
fore expressed concern about
several anticipated government in-
itiatives. These include revision of
the labor code, encouragement of
unionization, and increases in the
minimum wage. In addition they
include tax increases and strength-
ened enforcement of safety,
health, and environmental regula-
tions, which would raise produc-
tion costs and diminish "private
property rights."
These concerns represent chal-
lenges for Foxley and the rest of
Aylwin's cabinet, especially be-
cause the Pinochet government
attempted to limit economic ini-
tiatives in three ways. First, it
adopted a budget that conflicted
with the new government's pro-
grammatic priorities. Second, it
established a new central bank
with authority over monetary
policy, foreign exchange, and
banking, which were previously
within the purview of cabinet of-
ficers. And third, it depleted the
special reserve fund accrued from
copper revenue.
The incoming administration
faces other economic and fiscal
1 . 110
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worries as well. It fears that cop-
per prices may decline from their
current high levels and that the in-
ternational economy may weaken,
thereby muffling the expansion of
Chilean exports. It also fears that
demands for increased salaries
and for expanded government
spending on social programs and
economic infrastructure will
generate inflationary pressures.
Foxley reiterated these and
other concerns between December
1989 and March 1990. He sug-
gested the need for a "social pact"
between labor and business
during the transition to avoid the
inflationary pressures and political
crises that plagued President Radil
Alfonsin of Argentina in that
country's transition from military
rule to democratic government.
The new minister of economy,
Carlos Ominani, emphasized the
need to resist the tendency to
adopt "populist measures." In a
sense the Aylwin team has an ad-
vantage: for 16 years it studied the
defects and successes of Pinochet's
economic policies. They under-
stand the constraints imposed by
both the international economy
and the political exigencies of
democratization, and that satisfy-
ing the demands of the poorest
Chileans will, in the short term,
prove impossible.
So, while the economy is in rela-
tively good condition, a number of
foreseeable dangers confront the
Aylwin government. Among these
are the threat of inflation, vulner-
ability to price reductions in cop-
per and other key exports, the re-
quirement to reschedule the debt
payments due in 1990-92, the
challenges of labor relations and
of demands for an increased share
of the national income by non-
entrepreneurial groups, and the
budgetary constraints bequeathed
by the Pinochet government.
No less important is the poten-
tial rise of tensions within the coali-
tion. Underlying this potential are
the moderate tone of Aylwin's
economic team, the emphasis on
continuity with marginal redistri-
bution, and the decision to accept
most of the privatization initiatives
and to seek further foreign invest-
ment. Resulting tensions would
pit the coalition's populist and left-
ist members against its Christian
Democratic leadership. Inasmuch
as the Aylwin term of office will be
four years-instead of the eight
specified by the constitution for
subsequent presidents--early jock-
eying among the coalition's
partners for electoral advantage
could exacerbate its fragility.
In sum the new government
faces the challenges of democrati-
zation and coalition management,
as well as the tether fastened upon
BA
it by the Pinochet government
and the demands of the millions
of Chileans whose living condi-
tions declined during the past 16
years. No government could be ex-
pected to resolve these dilemmas
entirely. Further democratization,
amelioration of the misery of the
poorest Chileans, and continued
but slower economic growth repre-
sent an ambitious set of tasks.
The majority of Chileans
wanted the transition to proceed
smoothly and peacefully. The elec-
tions of December 14, 1989,
demonstrated the electoral weak-
ness of both the radical right and
the revolutionary left. Pragma-
tism, reformism, and a desire for
accommodation seemed to pre-
vail. As the government seeks to
deal concretely with the chal-
lenges before it, this spirit of
moderation will be sorely tested.
Key factors, therefore, will be:
how long can the original coali-
tion be sustained in more or less
original form? What fall-back coali-
tion will be created when the first
ministers and programs come
under attack? And how perma-
nent will the new-found pragma-
tism of social democrats and
socialists be when their constituen-
cies demand faster and more
profound departures from the
Pinochet legacy?
In the background will be the
political right and segments of the
military, with their implicit threat
to "correct" the political course
should it head in the "wrong"
direction. The Aylwin govern-
ment's careful management of
civil-military relations and the
human rights issue will be critical
in forestalling a return to authori-
tarian politics-an outcome most
military officers and entrepre-
neurs, as well as the rightist par-
ties, wish to avoid. March 1990
marked the hopeful beginning of
the restoration of democracy in
Chile. The restoration would be
neither easy nor complete, but
most Chileans were looking expec-
tantly to the future.
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US-Chilean Prospects
US-Chilean relations were correct,
but cool, after the plebiscite of Oc-
tober 1988. Official and private
sources of US funds, technical as-
sistance, and moral support for
the opposition angered Pinochet
and disappointed his policy-
makers.
Shortly after the plebiscite a
new US ambassador, Charles
Gillespie, replaced Harry Barnes,
who played a key role in support-
ing Pinochet's opposition. Ambas-
sador Gillespie inherited a
number of unresolved bilateral
issues, including the assassination
of Orlando Letelier in Washing-
ton, sanctions against Chile under
the General System of Preferences
and Tariffs, exclusion from pro-
gram benefits of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), and tensions over military
assistance programs. Chile's boom-
ing export trade also made the US
agricultural and industrial protec-
tionism a central concern in
bilateral relations.
After resolving the "poisoned
grape" matter in April 1989, US-
Chilean relations focused upon
broader trade issues, while US
diplomats in Santiago maintained
open and frequent contacts with
leading Chilean policymakers and
potential opposition appointees.
Private investors from large US
corporations (as well as investors
from Europe, Asia, New Zealand,
and Australia) expressed confi-
dence in Chile's future. They did
so both in public statements and
in new investments in Chilean
mining, banking and finance,
agriculture, and industry. IBM,
Exxon, Citicorp, Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, and other major US
firms committed significant new
resources to Chile in 1989.
Shortly before the December
1989 elections, a distinguished
group of Aylwin supporters visited
the US. Their purpose was to reas-
sure Americans concerning the
political vision of the Concertacin
and the Aylwin policy agenda.
Carlos Portales, an expert on US-
Chilean relations, identified four
policy concerns: maintenance of a
flow of funds to Chile to support
macroeconomic stability; con-
tinued Chilean access to US mar-
kets; removal of sanctions against
Chile under the General System
of Preferences and Tariffs, there-
by making Chile eligible for the
OPIC program; and approval of
an aid package to help finance
social programs.
With the advent of the Aylwin
administration, US-Chilean rela-
tions seem promising. There is
danger, however, in that Chile's
transition coincides with dramatic
transformations in Eastern
Europe and the USSR, as well as
more urgent matters in Latin
America, such as the political fall-
out from the Panama invasion,
the electoral defeat of the Sandi-
nistas in Nicaragua, drug and
guerrilla-related activity in Colom-
bia, Peru, and Bolivia, and debt
negotiations. US policymakers
might prove inattentive to the
need for economic assistance to
the fragile democratic coalition
headed by President Aylwin.
The success of Chile's transition
to democratic government
depends primarily upon internal
politics, economic acumen, and a
favorable world economy. Yet sup-
portive US policies would bolster
the Aylwin government and the
democratic transition. Whether
US policymakers will take ad-
vantage of this opportunity
remains to be seen. *
Editor's Note: This article is based on
a forthcoming chapter in James M.
Malloy and Eduardo A. Gamarra,
eds., Latin American and Carib-
bean Contemporay Record, vol. 8
(Holmes and Meier, 1991).
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Rebirth of Consensus
by Pamela Constable
Correa was a hunted
man, a socialist living un-
derground in military-
ruled Chile, furtively
meeting with colleagues
in crowded soccer stadiums and
forcing himself to forget people's
names in case he were arrested
and tortured. Today he is Chile's
new minister of transportation.
Not long ago, Manuel Bustos
was languishing in a small village
in southern Chile, legally ban-
ished after numerous spells in pris-
on, reviled by officials as a labor
agitator and political extremist.
Today he is photographed smiling
and shaking hands with industrial
leaders, publicly recognized as
their equal across the bargaining
table.
Not long ago, General Augusto
Pinochet was planning to project
his 16-year reign virtually into the
21st century, contemptuously dis-
missing his Christian Democratic
opponents as closet Marxists and
recycled hacks. Today he has
handed over the presidential sash
to Patricio Aylwin Azocar, 71-year-
old leader of the Christian Demo-
cratic Party.
Healing Wounds
The change taking place in Chile
is more than a shift in power.
True, the sight of the persecuted
replacing the persecutors, and the
losers stepping aside peacefully to
Pamela Constable is Latin America
correspondent for the Boston Globe,
and the winner of the 1989 media
award from the Latin American
Studies Association.
accommodate the winners, is
remarkable in itself. But the key
point is that after years of her-
metic divisions and harsh, glib
judgments, a process of genuine
consensus is building in a society
long polarized by fear and hatred.
Repatching this torn social
fabric has not been easy. The
mantle of Chile's 150-year democ-
racy, discarded in anger by so
many respectable citizens in 1973,
is by no means fully refurbished.
The installation of President Ayl-
win and 158 elected members of
congress on March 11 inaugu-
rated a tricky and vulnerable
period of civilian rule. There are
ample opportunities for sabotage
by factions of the army, the revolu-
tionary left, and the antidemo-
cratic right.
Chilean society remains
plagued by serious breaches, some
of which have been aggravated by
authoritarian rule. The historic
cultural gap between civilians and
the armed forces has widened
despite the years of military
"tutelage." Moreover the strain
has intensified with the prospect
that former or current officers
may be prosecuted and tried for
human rights abuses.
The economy has grown steadi-
ly since the severe recession of
1982, but the social gap between
rich and poor has become more
visible. The hardships of the
average factory worker or migrant
fruit picker-unprotected by
unions or social services-contrast
starkly with the lavish lifestyles of
the new stockbrokers or grape ex-
porters who have prospered in
Pinochet's "privatized" economy.
Finally, a pronounced political
gap has developed. At one pole
are those who remember and
cherish Chile's democratic tradi-
tions. At the other are those who
are too young to recall these tradi-
tions or have become conditioned
to believe that the right to buy
and sell at will is much more im-
portant than the right to vote or
publish a newspaper.
Yet events since mid-1988
demonstrate that a majority of
Chileans, and most leaders across
the political spectrum, are anxious
to bury the phantoms of 1973.
They are willing to lay down their
partisan and ideological preju-
dices and to resolve their differ-
ences in a spirit of compromise.
Despite Pinochet's best efforts,
military rule has made most
Chileans appreciate, rather than
denigrate, the past.
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Calm and Reason
Ever since Pinochet's defeat in the
October 5, 1988, plebiscite-itself
partly a product of the remark-
able coalition of diverse and quar-
relsome opposition groups-the
process of consensus has been
strengthening by the day. First,
over the strong objections of
Pinochet, opposition leaders and
government ministers agreed on a
package of constitutional reforms
that won easy approval by the
voters. Next, leftists swallowed a
bitter historic grudge to support a
Christian Democrat for president,
and the ambitions of dozens of
congressional candidates were
negotiated away in order to make
a biased and unwieldy electoral
system work.
Then came the election of
December 14, 1989. The armed
forces repeatedly pledged to
respect the results, and the two
pro-government candidates in-
stantly recognized Aylwin as the
winner. Furthermore the voters
rejected virtually all congressional
candidates on both political ex-
tremes in favor of moderate con-
servatives, Christian Democrats,
and socialists.
Addressing a jubilant crowd of
500,000 the next day, Aylwin-a
reassuring, grandfatherly figure-
vowed he would "loyally struggle
to make political power an instru-
ment to unite and not divide, to
create and not destroy, to close
old wounds that still pain the na-
tional soul." From then on the
dire warnings of a return to "com-
munist chaos" disappeared, and
pro-regime leaders moved to
make prudent peace with their
former enemies. Manuel Feliu,
head of the major business lobby,
signed a preliminary agreement
with Bustos, head of the largest
labor confederation. General
Fernando Matthei, the air force
commander who had dismissed
Aylwin's coalition as a "clown's
patchwork," expressed his
support for the president-elect.
Equally significant, the lan-
guage of confrontation and ab-
solutes vanished from debate
about economic policy. Today's
tone is one of calm and reason.
Center-left economists are cham-
pioning "fiscal prudence" and
conservative legislators-elect are
acknowledging the need to be
"socially responsible." After two
decades of ideological warfare and
five years of remarkable economic
recovery, a consensus is emerging
that market capitalism, tempered
by social consciousness and legal
limitations, is sounder than
statism or socialism as basis for
development.
As for Pinochet, whose rule was
based on keeping Chilean society
divided into armed and suspicious
camps, the forces of history have
simply been knitting around him.
The defeated military president
still wields enough power to
severely restrict Aylwin's maneu-
vering room during his transition-
al four-year term. But the country
is no longer at war, and the old
warrior seems an isolated anachro-
nism.
Will the consensus hold? Of
course not: once the euphoria
fades, the inevitable rivalries will
resurface, the pent-up demands of
the poor will intensify, and the
days of hard bargaining will
begin. Deep-seated mistrust
remains on all sides, and powerful
antidemocratic forces continue at
work. But all signs indicate a
broad agreement to work within
democratic rules, and a new will-
ingness to listen.
Soon, German Correa will be
negotiating with right-wing
truckers who once sabotaged the
Allende government. Soon,
former political prisoners will be
debating former regime ministers
in the senate. Already a former
dictator is legally reporting to his
democratically elected successor.
For a country that was exiled from
itself for 16 years, these are
miracles enough. .
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The hemisphere's Spanish-language
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its debut with the 1990s
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North Miami, Florida 33181
New Books on Latin America and the Caribbean
Nicaragua Divided
La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy
Patricia Taylor Edmisten
"Edmisten puts current Nicaraguan politics into perspec-
tive and gives the reader a sense of the complexities of
the present situation."
-Charles Ameringer, Pennsylvania State University
UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA PRESS
March 0972-3 Cloth $19.95
Dictionary of Latin American
Racial and Ethnic Terminology
Thomas M. Stephens
"For the first time a comprehensive collection of racial,
ethnic, and regional designations has been brought
together in one place.... It should dispel myths about
the lack of overt and covert discrimination in Latin
American ... a valuable dialectological tool."
-John M. Lipski, University of Florida
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
March 0965-0 Cloth $45.00
The Journal of Don Francisco
Saavedra de Sangronis, 1780-1783
ed. Francisco Morales Padr6n
trans. Aileen Moore Topping
"The turbulent and immensely fascinating Spanish
colonial world of the Caribbean at the close of the
American Revolution is stunningly revealed in this
excellently translated journal."
-Robert V. Remini, University of Illinois at Chicago
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0877-8 Cloth $28.00
Zespedes in East Florida, 1784-1790
Helen Hornbeck Tanner
"A very successful case-study of the East Florida
governorship in the first six years of Spain's return to the
peninsular province."--Americas
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA PRESS
0958-8 Paper $14.95
Jose Lezama Lima,
Poet of the Image
Emilio F. Bejel
"A stimulating and rigorous analysis of one of Spanish
America's most difficult and complex writers... a
significant addition to Lezama studies."-Justo C. Ulloa,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
April 0980-4 Cloth $19.95
Between God and the Party
Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba
John M. Kirk
"A comprehensive and balanced survey of relations
between church and state in Castro's Cuba. ... Kirk's
careful analysis of the role of religion in the processes of
social change in Latin America ... also illuminates an
aspect of the Cuban revolution often ignored."-Choice
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA PRESS
0909-X Paper $15.00
First Encounters
Spanish Explorations in the Caribbean
and the United States, 1492-1570
ed. Jerald T. Milanich & Susan Milbrath
"An excellent paradigm of what historical archaeology
and history have to offer in illuminating our past."
-Bruce D. Smith, Smithsonian Institution
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0946-4 Cloth $44.95; 0947-2 Paper $16.95
University Presses of Florida
15 NW 15th Street, Gainesville, Florida 32611, 904-392-1351
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Evangelical Awakening
by David Stoll
W hat if there were a
to Latin America's
problems? Luis
Palau, the Argen-
tine evangelist,
thought there was. That was why
he went to Guatemala in Novem-
ber 1982 to help evangelicals
celebrate the 100th anniversary of
Protestantism there. The eyes of
all Latin America were on Guate-
mala, he told a huge crowd in the
capital. They could make it the
first reformed nation in Latin
America. Guatemala could be a
country where the word of God
captivated so many military of-
ficers and entrepreneurs that it
brought about a social and politi-
cal transformation. The gospel
could liberate Guatemalans from
the chains of sin, Palau went on,
and it could liberate them from
the chains of poverty, misery, and
oppression. Through the gospel
ofJesus Christ, the evangelist
promised, the new Guatemalan
could build a new society.
At the rear, soldiers lounged
about the walls of a grim medieval-
like structure, the old Polytechnic
David Stoll is a doctoral candidate in
anthropology at Stanford University
and the author of Is Latin America
Turning Protestant? (University of
California Press, 1990).
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School for military officers, in the
bowels of which desaparecidos were
said to be held. But it was a sunny
day on the crowded parade
ground, and the multitude
cheered. Palau was not going to
enter into debates about the cur-
rent political situation: his mes-
sage was spiritual. Besides, the
president of the country was stand-
ing beside him.
"Here the one in charge is
Jesus Christ," declared Efrain Rios
Montt, the born-again army
general who had seized power
eight months before. The tone of
his voice was harsh, almost bel-
ligerent, but hallelujahs rose from
the crowd below. "We defend our-
selves not by the army or its
swords," he proclaimed, referring
to the most successful counterin-
surgency force in Central Ameri-
ca, "but by the Holy Spirit."
What Latin America lacked, the
general and the evangelist felt,
was born-again Protestantism;
only a mass conversion along
these lines, a moral transforma-
tion at the popular level, could
save Latin America from poverty
and chaos. "If we could eliminate
infidelity and immorality in Latin
America, we could cut poverty by
half in one generation," Palau was
accustomed to claim. "If a man
gives up immorality with women,
gives up getting drunk and all the
waste ... that goes with it, and
stops gambling, right there he is
salvaging a big chunk of his sal-
ary.... Consider the countries
where you needn't fear secret
police, where you can expect jus-
tice under the law, where the
military is under the guidance of
the people rather than oppressing
them, where education is valued,
where the press is relatively free,"
Palau reasoned. "Almost all such
nations have experienced spiritual
awakenings touching society at
the local level."
Four months later Pope John
Paul II stood on the same spot
and celebrated Mass. His organ-
izers had vowed to surpass the pre-
vious assembly, and the crowd was
indeed somewhat larger. But
when the Pope called upon the
people to hew to their faith, it was
because the Catholic Church was
losing ground on many fronts. It
could no longer claim Latin Amer-
ica as its own. The traditional
religious monopoly was giving
way, inside the Catholic Church in
the form of dissident movements
and outside the Church in the
form of evangelical churches.
What Happened to Liberation
Theology?
Estimates suggest that since 1960
evangelicals have tripled to more
than 10% of Latin America's popu-
lation. If that same rate of growth
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continues, by early in the next cen-
tury evangelicals will comprise a
third of the population. Owing to
high rates of Catholic nominalism,
they are already becoming the
majority of active churchgoers.
Evangelicals first became a major
presence in Chile, where they now
claim about 20% of the people,
and in the huge population of
Brazil, where they claim about
15%. Since the 1970s Central
America has taken the lead in
rapid growth: in Nicaragua evan-
gelicals claim a fifth of the popula-
tion, and in Guatemala a third.
The figures may be inflated,
but they worry Catholic authori-
ties. Beleaguered parish priests
sometimes give even higher fig-
ures. Evangelical inroads are espe-
cially surprising in view of what
was supposed to be the wave of
the future in Latin America: libera-
tion theology. The first signs of
liberation theology appeared fol-
lowing the Second Vatican Coun-
cil (1962-65) and its effort to
renew the Roman Catholic
Church. Shoring up the Church's
popular base with social activism
meant alienating governments
and military establishments.
When Central America broke out
in open warfare in the late 1970s,
both advocates and enemies of
liberation theology pointed to it as
the reason for new forms of grass-
roots support for revolution.
Depending on your point of view,
"consciousness-raising" was mobi-
lizing the masses or an insidious
new form of subversion. Govern-
ment death squads began to mur-
der priests and catechists and sud-
denly there was a martyr church,
with what appeared to be a vast
popular movement behind it.
A decade later evangelical
Protestantism is to be encountered
wherever one goes in Latin Amer-
ica, but liberation theology re-
quires more searching. Author
Phillip Berryman notes that sev-
eral times as many people belong
to evangelical churches as to the
"Christian base communities" that
put liberation theology into prac-
tice. Although base communities
continue to flourish throughout
Latin America, Berryman esti-
mates they have been set up in
only about 10% of the parishes.
Persecution by governments
and opposition from much of the
Catholic hierarchy, including
Pope John Paul II, have taken
their toll. In a death-squad state
like Guatemala, liberation theol-
ogy seems to have had the unin-
tended effect of promoting
evangelical growth. When Cath-
olic activists encouraged the poor
to confront power structures, they
abandoned the usual role of relig-
ion as an apolitical sanctuary.
Reprisals from the Guatemalan
army forced survivors to seek safe
haven, and they have found it in
conservative born-again churches.
As born-again Protestantism be-
comes a part of the alarming new
power configurations in the
Western Hemisphere, it continues
to be a popular movement on the
level of poor villages and neigh-
borhoods. What skeptics interpret
as an ethic of passivity and resig-
nation is, according to many
converts, an experience of em-
powerment. Whether converts are
getting off the bottle, spreading
the gospel, or striving to improve
their lot, they often speak of gain-
ing control over their lives and dis-
covering their destiny.
Some of the clearest signs of
grace are North American in ori-
gin: the evangelist in suit and tie,
the stage revival, the trip to an in-
ternational conference sponsored
by Billy Graham. Yet the rhythms
of the movement are very Latin
American. The vast majority of
Latin American evangelicals are
Pentecostals, who seek after spe-
cial gifts of the Holy Spirit-speak-
ing in tongues, prophecy, and
faith healing-which have affin-
ities with the emotional states of
traditional folk Catholicism.
Ironically one of the directives
most often received from the Holy
Spirit is to break away from North
American control. Research by
missionaries, many of them asso-
ciated with the Fuller School of
World Mission in Pasadena, Cali-
fornia, shows that North Ameri-
cans who try to stay in charge of
Latin American churches end up
choking off growth. When mis-
sionaries are forced to leave, it is
common for churches to grow
faster. After all, once local leaders
are on their own, the only way
they can make a living is by going
out and spreading the faith. As for
North American handouts-fre-
quently accused of being the
reason for evangelical gains-they
are more likely to encourage inter-
nal squabbling than to attract last-
ing converts.
Under harsh austerity regimes,
evangelical churches have become
an opportunity for poor people to
organize themselves in a politically
safe way. Dismissing revolutionary
agendas as illusory, these groups
concentrate on the moral strug-
gles of their members to stop
drinking, hold their families to-
gether, and work their way up in
the world. Far from representing
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diversionary issues, vice and vir-
tue can determine whether the
poor survive in countries being
torn apart by the international
debt crisis and social violence.
Invasion of the Sects
In Guatemala the brief rule of
Efrain Rios Montt in 1982-83 was
more a product of the evangelical
boom than a cause of it. But he
left a powerful impression, preach-
ing every Sunday over the air-
waves while leading a ferocious
counterinsurgency campaign.
Rios Montt has come to symbolize
both the hope and dread over
evangelical expansion in Latin
America. Five years after being
deposed by fellow army officers,
he launched a campaign to be
elected president in 1991. Early
polls identified him as one of the
two frontrunners, even though
the Guatemalan constitution dis-
qualifies him as the past leader of
a coup.
Among the most preoccupied
by Rios Montt is the local Catholic
hierarchy, which has spoken out
against the "invasion of the sects,"
and has accused the US govern-
ment of encouraging evangelical
Protestantism as a way to keep the
region under control. This idea of
a born-again planning room deep
in the National Security Council
(NSC) sounds like a figment of the
imagination. Obviously it could
never explain a popular religious
movement, but it might explain
how that movement is being
manipulated. After all, an NSC of-
ficial named Oliver North was no
figment of the imagination, nor
the way he and the Reagan ad-
ministration used evangelicals as
part of their "low-intensity" war-
fare against the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua.
US influence-buying began
with the Miskito ethnic minority
on the Atlantic Coast, several
years before Oliver North came
on the scene. Since the Miskitos
are Moravian Protestants, this
move focused Sandinista reactions
on the country's evangelicals. In
1980 a US diplomat began to
channel money to Nicaraguan pas-
tors through an anti-Sandinista
missionary working for In-Depth
Evangelism, a Costa Rican spin-off
of the highly regarded Latin
America Mission. At one point 600
pastors--40% of the entire Nicara-
guan pastorate-were receiving
small monthly installments from
this source.
As soon as the Sandinistas
began to crack down on evangeli-
cals suspected of undermining
national defense, they could be
accused of religious persecution.
This task was undertaken by the
Institute on Religion and Democ-
racy, a neoconservative group
dating to the start of the Reagan
administration. After the US
Congress cut off the contras for
their human rights violations,
various evangelical groups con-
ferred with Colonel North on how
to provide them with "humani-
tarian" support. Evangelicals who
came to the aid of the contras-in-
cluding Pat Robertson and the
Christian Broadcasting Network,
Gospel Crusade, Trans-World Mis-
sions, and the Christian Emer-
gency Relief Teams-tend to be
charismatic, the style of Pentecos-
talism tarnished in the 1987-88
television scandals. One reason
charismatic Protestants found
North persuasive is that he is one
of them, as a member of the
Church of the Apostles in Fairfax,
Virginia.
Together with the Reagan ad-
ministration, these groups por-
trayed Sandinista Nicaragua as a
furnace of religious persecution.
Actually evangelicals were always
free to worship. The Comit6 Evan-
gilico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo built
up an impressive pro-Sandinista
evangelical alliance supported by
ecumenical Protestants in North
America and Europe. Gradually
the Sandinistas learned how to ac-
commodate conservative Protes-
tants, at the cost of allowing them
greater freedom to organize
against the revolution. Yet the
US-sponsored "freedom fighters"
pushed Nicaraguan evangelicals
into the line of fire, with such
devastating results that many
wanted to flee to the US-hardly
the way to build strong local
churches as most missionaries
realize.
Fearful of being burned them-
selves, the majority of evangelical
missionaries kept their distance
from the Reagan administration's
war in Nicaragua. Only a few
joined Catholics and ecumenical
Protestants in opposing it, how-
ever, encouraging the idea that
conservative evangelicals are
pawns of US foreign policy.
As the contra war shows, North
American missions continue to be
so influential that they can give
local evangelicals a reputation
they do not deserve. US-based
agencies still dominate evangelical
radio and television in Latin
America, supply the major
revivalists, train many of the na-
tional leaders, and finance the ef-
forts to integrate the hundreds of
Latin American denominations
into suitably conservative national
alliances and councils. Even if the
vast majority of evangelicals now
belong to Latin American-run
churches, their leaders continue
to look to North Americans for
inspiration.
Evangelical politics is not just a
function of what missionaries
want, however. The churches
resulting from all the splits away
from missions, not to mention fur-
ther splits ad infinitum, are
notoriously hard to organize and
lead in any particular direction.
High-publicity congresses such as
"Los Angeles '88," which drew
6,316 Hispanic delegates to
southern California and made
evangelicals look like a movement
coordinated from the US, beg the
question of who is represented
aside from the leaders transported
to the occasion by North Ameri-
can sponsors.
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The Perils of Protestantism
Compared to Catholic martyrs
and Marxist revolutionaries, pious
folk singing hymns in cinder-
block chapels are hard to visualize
as the blazing edge of social
change in Latin America. Yet as
sociologist David Martin points
out, these kinds of groups have a
long history. From the Protestant
Reformation to the Industrial
Revolution, in frontier awaken-
ings in North America and now all
over the colonized world, con-
gregational forms of social organi-
zation have helped the victims of
capitalist transformation survive it.
Evangelicals are not alone in
organizing new congregational
groups in Latin America. Some
Catholics are doing so as well by
promoting base communities and
the charismatic renewal, a
separate revitalization movement
that has adopted the Pentecostal
agenda of baptism in the Holy
Spirit. Each of these Catholic and
Protestant movements is organ-
ized around the Bible and small,
voluntary face-to-face groups that
reinforce and discipline their
members. Each is encouraging
poor people to redefine them-
selves, renegotiate their relations
with powerholders, and work out
new forms of survival in an ever
more menacing political economy.
Each is building up new kinds of
communities and redefining how
men are expected to behave
toward their families. "Tonight we
are going to weep!" a burly Guate-
malan preacher bellows with his
fists slashing the air. "Tonight
grown men are going to break
down and cry!" How men treat
their families, how children are
socialized, and how people relate
to authority-basic relationships
in Latin American culture-are
being reworked in congregational
religion.
Once we draw parallels with US
and European Protestantism, it is
tempting to view evangelical
growth as a harbinger of success-
ful capitalism in Latin America,
that is, the kind that benefits the
majority of people. So believe
evangelists such as Luis Palau, as
do a growing number of converts
from Central America's monied
classes. Many are to be found in
affluent charismatic congregations
such as the Church of the Word,
which attracted Rios Montt several
years before he took power. Like
Oliver North, these affluent charis-
matics combine free-market
ideology with belief in miracles.
Looking for vindication as revolu-
tionary movements threaten their
privileges, they hope to call down
the Holy Spirit on Central Ameri-
can capitalism and give it a sense
of moral responsibility.
With their suits and ties, Protes-
tant evangelists project an image
of capitalist prosperity, an old and
tragic dream in Latin America. At
a time when the capitalist market
is triumphing politically around
the world yet continues to fail so
spectacularly for most Latin Amer-
icans, danger lurks in promising
rewards for Protestant virtue that
fail to materialize. What happens
when debt and disorder choke off
the possibilities for what mission-
ary thinker Guillermo Cook has
called "redemption and lift"-the
past capacity of evangelical Protes-
tantism to help converts move up-
ward in the social scale?
So great is the ambiguity and
flux in grassroots religion that it is
time to think in terms of an over-
arching religious reformation
embracing both liberation theol-
ogy and evangelical Protestantism.
The common denominator is con-
gregational social organization-
in the base communities of libera-
tion theology, in the charismatic
renewal in Roman Catholicism,
and in the evangelical churches.
Interpreters of varying persua-
sions have given base commu-
nities an aura of radicalism and
evangelical congregations an
image of conformism. The reality,
though, is more complicated.
However different the ideas of
evangelical missionaries and polit-
ical activists may be about the
direction their struggling believers
should take, the influence of out-
siders has limits. Owing to the
punishment being taken by Latin
America's poor, there may be less
difference in the future between
base communities and evangelical
congregations than there is now.
Meanwhile evangelical Protes-
tantism has become a rising in-
dicator, along with debt, inflation,
unemployment, and violence. It is
also stirring Latin American fears
of deepening subordination to the
US. Is born-again Protestantism
really a vast revitalization move-
ment, or is it just a manipulated
bearer of false hopes from the US?
In Central America, US policy-
makers and the religious right
have made it more difficult to
choose between these two inter-
pretations than might otherwise
be the case. .
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Divided Nation, Divided Church
by Brady Tyson
n December 1989 Brazil's
electorate chose Fernando
Collor de Mello as the coun-
try's first popularly elected
president in 30 years. Yet the
electoral campaign laid bare a
trend of political polarization
within the nation and its Catholic
Church. On one side are interests
that fear rapid, radical social
change. On the other side are in-
terests committed to the expan-
sion of popular participation in
politics and to a more equitable
distribution of wealth.
From Brazil to Rome
During the electoral campaign
many bishops and cardinals open-
ly or quietly sided with one side or
the other. For example, in an elec-
tion-day homily on the conserva-
tive O Globo network's weekly
television show, Rio de Janeiro's
Cardinal-Archbishop Dom
Eugenio Salles lambasted the "left-
ist parties," repeating almost tex-
tually the charges of conservative
candidate Collor against his popu-
list opponent, Luis Inicio "Lula"
da Silva. In contrast, a leading
bishop, Dom Mauro Morelli of a
diocese that neighbors Rio de
Janeiro, was part of a pre-election
welcoming delegation for Lula
and was mentioned as a possible
member of Lula's presidential
cabinet. Hundreds of priests open-
ly campaigned for Lula, while
Brady Tyson, professor of internation-
al relations in the School of Interna-
tional Service, American University,
has served as a Methodist missionary
in Brazil.
hundreds of others were equally
active on Collor's behalf.
The electoral activism and polit-
ical division of the Confederafdo
Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil
(CNBB) stem partly from the
Church's travails during the mili-
tary dictatorship of 1964-85 and
partly from today's climate of hy-
perinflation and widespread im-
poverishment. Both sides of
Church leadership are painfully
aware of the gravity of the nation's
current economic ills. What
divides the Catholic hierarchy are
profound disagreements over the
causes of these ills and the pro-
posed role of the Church in ad-
dressing them. When the
Church's upper echelons speak,
they tend to do so as progressistas
and conservadores, though neither
voice is monotonic.
During the military dictator-
ship the progressive movement
emerged within the Church to
defend priests and nuns from
government repression. The
evolution of the progressistas, which
involved the "preferential option
for the poor," as formulated at the
1968 Medellin and 1979 Puebla
conferences of Latin American
bishops, led to its advocating a
more communitarian Church.
This orientation fits the Latin
American-wide mold of ecclesiasti-
cal base communities. Heading
the progressistas are Dom Paulo
Evaristo Arns, a Franciscan who is
the cardinal of Sao Paulo; Dom
Aloisio Lorscheider, a former
president of the Episcopal Con-
ference of Latin America who is
the cardinal of Fortaleza; and
Dom Luciano Mendes de Almei-
da, a Jesuit who is president of
CNBB and bishop of Mariana.
Minas Gerais.
Since 1983, when the military
began to relax its iron hand, a
major surprise has been the
failure of Brazil's ecclesiastical
base communities to emerge as a
powerful new bloc of electoral sup-
port for populist politicians. Even
so, the country's 85,000 to
100,000 base communities, whose
total membership is three to four
million people, are significant in
the political mobilization of the
poor and as a school for new
grassroots leaders. Not only are
they activists in local development
and religious issues. The majority
of their hard-core members are
also activists in Lula's Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT), where they rep-
resent more than a third of Lula's
political base.
The grassroots focus of the
progressistas contrasts sharply with
the top-down approach of most
conservadores. Such conservadores
generally stress passive acceptance
of the religious and sociopolitical
hierarchy and believe social
change must flow in slow, trickle-
down fashion. This approach
reflects the traditional orientation
of the European Catholic Church,
which deeply distrusts Third
World movements. It appeals to
the values of ordem e progresso
through the traditional hierarchy
and symbols of the Church, as
provided by Pope John Paul II.
Since the 1970s individualistic,
evangelical currents-which
provide a conservative Catholic
alternative to fundamentalist
Protestantism-have broadened
and invigorated the conservadores.
At the lead of the conservadores
are Cardinal Dom Eugenio Salles,
of the Rio de Janeiro archdiocese,
Hemisphere * Winter/Spring 1990
. . .. . ., ,J
and Cardinal Karl Ratzinger, a
German, who is president of the
Congregation of Doctrine and
Faith of the Curia, the Vatican's
powerful administrative body in
Rome. Under Ratzinger's strong
leadership, the Curia is even more
staunchly conservative than John
Paul II. It is therefore determined
to discipline, disband, and silence
the progressistas, in favor of a tradi-
tional European approach.
Strident criticism of the conser-
vadores by the political left and the
progressistas caused some parishes
in Minas Gerais to vote for Collor,
out of fear the "communist lean-
ings" of Lula and the Frente
Popular would lead them to "close
the churches." During the presi-
dential campaign, Rio de Janeiro's
major daily, OJornal do Brasil, pub-
lished two or three signed articles
each week by leading conservative
Catholic clergy, attacking their
counterparts in the progressive
camp. The conservative perspec-
tive is more culturally pervasive
and widely accepted among Brazil-
ians than that of the progressistas,
who represent some 10% of the
electorate. A political disadvantage
of the conservadores is their limited
organization at the grassroots
level, though to some degree the
approach of the Catholic evangeli-
cals-including their aggressive
use of the electronic media-is ad-
dressing this weakness.
Their differences aside, the
ideologies of both the progressive
and conservative camps are
anchored in the Catholic Church's
"organic" view of society. The
Church-including John Paul II-
has criticized capitalism as well as
communism, claiming that neither
comprises the truly just and order-
ly society espoused in the
Church's social teachings. This
view has propelled a search for an
elusive "third way" upon which to
build a harmonious world. Many
of the progressive camp's leading
bishops believe that, in their quest
for such a world, the main oppo-
sition within the Vatican is the
conservative bloc led by Ratzinger
and Salles; John Paul II, they
believe, is a potential ally.
From the progressive stand-
point, the Pope has manifested
deep concern for the poor of
Latin America, Africa, and Asia;
and in spite of his emphasis on
the traditions of hierarchical struc-
ture and papal authority, he sym-
pathizes with the progressive
movement's goals. Yet, according
to the progressistas, the Pope's
capacity to act on his sympathies is
restricted by the pronounced
conservative bent of the vast
machinery of the Catholic Church
and by his dependence on the
leadership and bureaucracy of the
Curia. The progressistas claim that
a result of the organizational
leverage of Ratzinger and Salles is
that, of the 50 new Brazilian
bishops named during the tenure
of John Paul II, none has been a
progressista: all have represented
either the moderate or conserva-
tive blocs, thereby undercutting
the influence of the progressistas in
CNBB.
Brazilian Dynamics
Despite the efforts of the progressis-
tas and conservadores alike, Brazil-
ian society will continue moving
towards a tolerant secularism. Sim-
ilar to Italians and French, Brazil-
ians will tend to respect, but not to
adhere politically, to any sector of
the Church. The progressistas and
conservadores will remain signifi-
cant minority political forces.
After all, they wield powerful
symbols and authority, and they
possess major cadres and organiza-
tional resources. The Church in
general, however, does not com-
mand the attention of most
Brazilians.
The struggle between the
Catholic progressistas and conser-
vadores will continue to be played
out in Brazilian political forums,
but its principal arena will be
within the Church, including the
Vatican and world Catholicism. In
this respect Brazil is the world's
largest Catholic nation. Moreover
its religious currents are tightly
bound up with the daunting array
and depth of the country's social,
cultural, political, and economic
dynamics, as illustrated by the
spread of evangelical Catholicism.
Not surprisingly the Catholic
Church of Brazil is an innovator
in theological thought and prac-
tice.
Meanwhile the profundity of
Brazil's economic and social chal-
lenges call for its traditional politi-
cal system-fragmented and
fragmentizing-to yield to a new
vision. At stake is the democratic
process of articulating and imple-
menting one or another way out
of Brazil's current plight. This
process will continue to be stimu-
lated by, and reflected in, the pro-
gressive and conservative sectors
of its Catholic Church. .
Hemisphere • Winter/Spring 1990
Turnabout
is fair play
RUN-UF-MILL maps place the U.S, above. Since
"upper" is equated with 'superior," this has bred
misconceptions and mischief. The Tumrnbout Mop
of the Americas offers a corrective perspective.
For students, office, gift giving. In art colors, 17x23"
English, Spanish or Portuguese. $7.00 at book and
map stores. Or by mail $8.50 pp; (add'l maps $7.00).
Foreign $9.50 - Laguna Sales, Dept. K 7040 Via
Valverde, San Jose, CA 95135 In Calif. aad 6% s.t.
'ort-of-Spain
TRINIDAD
0 Siparia
VENEZUELA

W!
Haiti: New Cast, Old Script
by Alex Stepick
The Rainy Season
by Amy Wilentz. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1989. 427 pp. $19.95.
honking of car horns
awakened me before
dawn. I was living in the
Little Haiti neighbor-
hood of Miami, and my
neighbors were prematurely cele-
brating the demise of Jean Claude
Duvalier after the US government
had mistakenly announced his
departure. By mid-morning the
celebration evaporated. It was
only the first of many times that
both US authorities and Haitians
mistakenly thought Haiti had
really changed.
Precisely a week later, I was
again awakened by pre-dawn
revelry from the streets. This time
Duvalier really had left, trans-
ported to France aboard a US
army plane. The celebration con-
tinued for a number of days, fill-
ing Little Haiti's streets with
people and an impromptu parade
of cars. Hope filled the air.
Over the next four years the
scene repeated itself again and
again as five governments came
and went, each promising im-
provements and democracy and
each failing to deliver on its
promises. Soon the phrase
"Duvalierism without Duvalier"
spread beyond the radical fringe.
Alex Stepick is associate professor of
anthropology at Florida International
University. His most recent publication
(with Carol Dutton Stepick) is "People
in the Shadows: Survey Research
among Haitians in Miami," Human
Organization (Spring 1990).
The well-worn cliche, "plus ca
change, plus c'est la meme chose,"
could hardly be more apt. A
military junta, massacred voters,
fraudulent elections, and repeated
coups have been punctuated by
violence, looting, and apparent
chaos. A few Duvalierists have
been uprooted, killed, or exiled,
but many remain in place. And
the physical conditions that shock
and depress so many from the
developed world persist: the per-
vasive, wretched poverty and the
devastated, eroded landscape. It
all appears utterly hopeless, at
least to most foreigners.
When writing and talking
about Haiti, foreign journalists
and diplomats tend to fix their
concentration on the succession of
dictators. Except for quaint and
sporadic reports on voodoo, their
attention remains riveted on the
gleaming white national palace
and the surrounding military bar-
racks. They search for the will and
desires of the Haitian masses by
talking to those who speak easily
understandable English. Then
they move on, called by the next
crisis in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or
perhaps China and Eastern
Europe. They do not have the
time to penetrate beyond their
dazzling and depressing first im-
pressions of Haiti.
Appearances can be deceiving,
though, especially in Haiti. Be-
tween the violent punctuation
points and the repetitious riot
scenes, social forces move individ-
uals; and since Duvalier's depar-
ture, subtle rearrangements in
these forces have emerged. Grass-
roots organizations have arisen;
liberation theology inspires; the
press speaks; and the forces of the
old regime-the various divisions
of the armed forces, the mulatto
elite, and the Duvalierists-scram-
ble to recover their power and
constrain the new forces.
Most foreigners, and especially
journalists, fail to see all these oc-
currences. A few journalists, for-
tunately, are exceptions. They
learn Creole. Then they venture
alone beyond Port-au-Prince and
listen to those who otherwise have
no voice.
A Deeper View
Amy Wilentz, who first went to
Haiti as one of the pack covering
the impending downfall of Jean
Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, has
produced a book that easily out-
shines the journalistic reports of
publications such as the New York
Times, the Washington Post, and
Time. Wilentz stayed longer, knew
more Creole, and talked to more
Haitians than any other journalist
since Bernard Diederich, who
detailed Frangois "Papa Doc"
Duvalier's rise to power.
Her book details the three
years of instability from the fall of
Baby Doc Duvalier in early 1986
to the beginning of 1989. While
scholars will find fault with her
book, she depicts a Haiti far more
complex and more human than
other journalists describe, and far
more vivid and accessible than
scholars report.
The hero of her story is Father
Jean-Berprand Aristide, the
diminutive, charismatic Salesian
priest whose stirring sermons and
fearless deeds galvanized many of
Haiti's poor in the aftermath of
Duvalier's departure. Aristide
emerges as a remarkably coura-
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geous man, as when he walked at
the front of a march on Fort
Dimanche, the ending point for
many of Duvalier's enemies. Sol-
diers fired on the crowd, but
Aristide marched forward with
Bible and microphone in hand,
broadcasting the incident live for
Radio Soleil (Haiti's Catholic-run
radio station). Six were killed and
more than 50 wounded. Aristide
became a national hero.
Later, he himself became the
enemy as attacks came both from
more conservative forces within
the Church and from the armed
forces. In a sense Aristide's popu-
larity saved him. To martyr him
would have roused the masses
even more than his stirring ser-
mons. The Church ordered him
out of the country, but the book
ends in January 1989 with his
refusal to leave. Instead he had
gone into hiding, sending cas-
settes to radio stations urging an
uprising: "Alone we are weak;
together we are strong. Together,
we are the flood. The blessing of
the Lord is upon the people. Let
his grace descend until the flood
itself brings down all Duvalierists,
all Macoutes, all criminals from
this day forth and forever more,
amen" (p. 391).
There is no doubt where
Wilentz's sympathies lie-with
deep, fundamental change, em-
powerment of the urban and rural
masses, and dechoukaj, "the uproot-
ing of the old system"-but the
book does not focus solely on
Aristide and the popular organiza-
tions that arose in the wake of
Duvalier's departure. Wilentz pro-
vides a voice to the opposing fac-
tions within Haitian society. She
poignantly contrasts her firsthand Little cotrst herm ,rta th ,I fd fBbDc e a98
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experiences with Aristide to the
impressions, stories, and rumors
sown by his enemies-US Embas-
sy officials, American missionaries,
and voodoo priests formerly close
to Duvalier.
For example, she persuasively
portrays the views of the mulatto
elite by focusing primarily on a
dinner party she attended in
Petionville, the most exclusive sub-
urb of Port-au-Prince. Wilentz ef-
fectively presents the positions of
the US Embassy spokesman, as
she charts his drift from firm op-
timist as the Namphy junta
promised democracy, to dejected
skeptic immediately after the elec-
tion massacre of November 1987.
International journalists also oc-
cupy a central place, although her
portrayal of many of them is less
sympathetic than her picture of
Haitians, even Duvalierists.
Wilentz, however, apparently
did not have any close contacts
within the Catholic Church hierar-
chy, the one group that has no
voice in her book. She accurately
describes the Church as riven by
divisions between progressives
and conservatives, but no one ar-
gues the cause of the Church as
an institution, its fundamental con-
cern for maintaining nearly 2,000
years of spiritual integrity. While
politics have always intruded on,
and were frequently launched by,
the Church, politics were usually
restrained if the Church risked ex-
pulsion or if the society, at least in
the minds of conservative Church
leaders, risked breakdown. The
Haitian Catholic Church did expe-
rience expulsion under Papa Doc,
and to some, the politics of Aris-
tide and other progressives endan-
gered the fundamental cohesion
of the society. While one may dis-
agree with the position of conser-
vative Church members, it would
have been better for Wilentz to
give a voice to those conservative
forces who, for the moment, have
regained the upper hand.
Wilentz attempts to provide
context and historical depth. She
provides condensed descriptions
of the Haitian Revolution (1792-
1804), foreign (especially US) aid,
the genesis of deforestation and
erosion, the evolution of Haitian
politics from the ashes of the
Revolution, and the social and cul-
tural meaning of voodoo. These
historical synopses provide a
framework for interpreting her
travels and exploits with peasants,
political candidates, development
workers, voodoo priests, mission-
aries, children from the poor
neighborhoods, army officials,
and vigilantes.
Who's Responsible?
The book's most important
achievement is that it conveys the
frustrations and failures of Haiti's
recent efforts to obtain democracy
without implicitly resorting to the
racist explanations that commonly
gird the opinions of non-Haitians.
In the wake of the 1987 election
massacre and subsequent military
regimes, some US officials stated
that no one could "expect any-
more from Haiti" than dictators,
repression, and corruption. The
responsibility for terror and cor-
ruption was swiftly hung on the
regime, and either explicitly or
implicitly upon the entire people
and culture or upon an entire
race.
Journalists are more subtle
than American officials. Rather
than directly blaming individuals
within Haitian institutions, jour-
nalists typically describe the hor-
rible events, indicating that the
army or "thugs" were responsible.
Little effort and few column
inches are devoted to addressing
the question of what interests the
army and "thugs" are defending
so violently. Similarly journalists
seldom address why a dictator
stays in power.
These omissions imply that the
sole basis for the stability of non-
democratic regimes is repression.
Thus comes the expectation that
when a repressive regime is
removed, democracy and freedom
will follow.
This perspective overlooks the
extent of domestic and interna-
tional support for the dictatorial
regimes. Through both repression
and concession, Papa Doc
recruited and consolidated sup-
port, most obviously in the armed
forces, but also among civilians
who gained access to power and
wealth. These Duvalierists have
struggled unceasingly to retain
their privileges. Moreover the
Duvalierist power base was built
upon the solid foundation of un-
equal social relationships between
mulattos and blacks and between
city and country, which have ex-
isted since the French established
plantations in Haiti. There are
thus many others, such as mer-
chants and those involved in the
assembly industries, who may not
be firm Duvalierists, yet who see
grassroots democratization as a
threat to their interests.
Experts on Haiti will find fault
with much that is left out of
Wilentz's analysis of Haitian social
structure. More important, how-
ever, are the details and narrative
she does include, which provide a
sympathetic and compelling ac-
count of the three years of Haiti's
struggles after Duvalier fled for
France. u
(Photos by Gary Monroe, Photography
Department, Daytona Beach Com-
munity College)
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New and Recent Books on Latin America
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key
assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth) 448 pp. $39.95
THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans
This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that
have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth) $24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper) 240pp. $14.95
POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth) 432 pp. $34.95
REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor
Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among
various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region
during this period.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth) 256 pp. $29.95
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Protestantism in Latin America
by Marian Goslinga
Although Protestantism has always maintained a tenuous foothold in Latin America, the 20th century has
witnessed a veritable upsurge in evangelical missionary activities throughout the region. The resulting
success has been at the expense of the Roman Catholic Church and can partly be explained by the
latter's failure to align itself with the prevailing forces of change.
In general the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has continued to promote those traditional
values and conservative concepts that can no longer fully satisfy large segments of an increasingly restless
as well as more sophisticated population. The Protestant churches-mainline as well as the various "sects"-have
stepped into this vacuum and, in most countries, have become a power to be reckoned with.
The following is an overview of recent publications on the subject.
Anglicanism in Nicaragua, 1745-
1985. Robert W. Renouf. Anglican
and Episcopal History, v. 57 (Decem-
ber 1988), p. 382-96.
Apuntes para una historia de
presbiteranismo en Cuba. Rafael
Cepeda, et al. La Habana: Edi-
ciones Su Voz, 1986.
At Home in Latin America:
Anglicanism in a New Context.
John L. Kater Jr. Anglican and
Episcopal History, v. 57 (March
1988), p. 4-37.
The Base Movement as a Model
of "Development." J. J. Krit-
zinger. Missionalia, v. 17 (April
1989), p. 31-44. [A comparison of
Latin American and African com-
munities.]
Befriad Kyrka: Latinamerikansk
teologi. Carl Fredrik Hallen-
creutz. Svensk Missionstidskrift,
v. 77, no. 1 (1989), p. 1-53.
Being Evangelized in El Salvador.
Tim Dutcher-Walls. Christian Cen-
tury, v. 105 (November 30, 1988),
p. 1084-85.
Bible in Hand: Evangelics March
in Tikal, Guatemala. Paul Lewis.
New York Times, v. 138 (June 15,
1989), p. 4.
The "Big Mango" and Christian
Mission. Roger S. Greenway.
Urban Mission, v. 6 (November
1988), p. 7-55. [About Mexico.]
British Baptist Missionaries and
Baptist Work in the Bahamas.
Peter Brewer. Baptist Quarterly,
v. 32 (April 1988), p. 295-301.
La cantera de donde fuimos
sacados: testimonios hist6ricos
bautistas.Jose Maria Ruiz, et al.
Jorge Pixley, ed. Managua: Centro
Intereclesial de Estudios Teol6gi-
cos y Sociales, 1988. [About
Nicaragua.]
Caribbean Churches and the
Redemptive Use of Mass Media.
Robert Bernhardt. Caribbean Jour-
nal of Religious Studies, v. 9 (April
1988), p. 27-34.
Celebration: A Centenary History
of the Aramalaya Presbyterian
Church, Tunapuna, Trinidad,
1881-1981. Marianne Soarez
Ramesar, Horace Bhupsingh.
Tunapuna, Trinidad: Aramalaya
Presbyterian Church, 1988.
The Central American Evan-
gelicals: From Protest to Prag-
matism. Everett A. Wilson. Interna-
tional Review of Mission, v. 77
(January 1988), p. 94-106.
Christian Hope for Liberation
and Popular Movements. Aloisio
Krohling. Mission Studies, v. 6, no.
1 (1989), p. 35-40. [About Brazil.]
Church Growth in Acapulco:
Planting a Whole Presbytery.
Richard Dye. Urban Mission, v. 3
(January 1986), p. 34-38.
A conselhamento pastoral e
libertagio. Lothar Carlos Hoch.
Estudos Teoldgicos (Brazil), v. 29,
no. 1 (1989), p. 17-40. [Discusses
Protestant and Catholic practice.]
La cultura como mediaci6n para
evangelizar la no-creencia en
America Latina.Jaime Vilez
Correa. Bogota: Consejo Episcopal
Latinoamericano, 1989.
De sectas a sectas: una aproxima-
ci6n al estudio de un fen6meno
apasionante. Angel Saldanra, et al.
Mexico: Claves Latinoamericanas,
1987. [About Mexico.]
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Marian Goslinga is the Latin
American and Caribbean librarian at
Florida International University.
Delegates of the World and the
Sleeping Giant: Religion as
Interclass Politics in a Rural
Panamanian Community. Gloria
Rudolf. Urban Anthropology and
Studies of Cultural Systems and
World Economic Development, v. 17
(Winter 1988), p. 323-50.
Etica protestante y progreso
econ6mico: las colonias agrarias
holandesas calvinistas en Argen-
tina y Brasil. Fred Jongkind.
Cristianismo y Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1
(1989), p. 83+.
Familiar Hymns in an Unfamiliar
Context: Congregational Song in
the Revival Zion Churches of
Jamaica. Terry E. Miller. Hymn,
v. 40 (January 1989), p. 15-19.
Five Principles of Indigenous
Church Organization: Lessons
from a Brazilian Pentecostal
Church. Reed E. Nelson. Missiol-
ogy, v. 17 (January 1989), p. 39-51.
Die Frommen und die Siinder-
Zivilisierte und Wilde: Die
Mission der Rama in Mittel-
amerikanischen Tiefland. Robin
Z. Schneider. Missiology, v. 14, no.
4 (1988), p. 221-31. [About the
missionary activities of the
Moravian Church in Central
America.]
The Fundamentalist Surge in
Latin America. Penny Lernoux.
Christian Century, v. 105 (January
22, 1988), p. 51-54.
God's People Have Suffered
Enough. Statement by the Angli-
can Bishops at Lambeth. Witness,
v. 72 (May 1989), p. 20-21. [About
Central America.]
Hacia una fe evangelica latino-
americanista: una perspectiva
bautista.Jorge Pixley, ed. San Jose:
Editorial DEI, 1988.
Haitian Christians Press on Amid
Poverty, Violence. David Disch.
Christian Times, v. 33 (May 12,
1989), p. 46-48.
The House Church as a Tool for
Urban Evangelism. Donald Jones.
Urban Mission, v. 6 (March 1989),
p. 27-32. [About Paraguay.]
Iglesia, cristianismo y religi6n en
America Central: resumen bibli-
ografico, 1960-1980. Guillermo
Melindez. San Jose: Editorial DEI,
1988.
Inmigraci6n, libertad de cultos y
desarrollo econ6mico. Jean
Baptiste Bastian, ed. Cristianismo y
Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1 (1989), p. 5-
100.
Is Latin America Turning
Protestant? David Stoll. University
of California Press, 1990.
Jesus and El Salvadorean
Women. Ruth Mooney. Daughters
of Sarah, v. 15 (May-June 1989),
p. 8-10.
Latin America Evangelist. Coral
Gables, Florida: Latin America
Mission. [Periodical that began in
1921 and is still being published
on a regular basis.]
Latin American Pentecostalism.
Miriam Reidy. One World, no. 135
(May 1988), p. 6-7.
Liberation at Ground Level.
Wayne W. Foltz-Urffer. Christianity
and Crisis, v. 49 (February 20,
1989), p. 93-94. [Review of Faith of
a People: The Story of a Christian
Community in El Salvador, 1970-
1980, P. Galdamez (1980).]
La lucha por el control religioso
e ideol6gico en la Argentina:
invasi6n de sectas y corpora-
ciones. Hugo Ortega. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 78
(March 1986), p. 15-18.
Methodism's 150th Anniversary
in Argentina: An Occasion for Re-
Evaluating the Missionary Role.
Raymond K. DeHainaut. Interna-
tional Review of Mission, v. 77
(January 1988), p. 87-93.
Metodismo, campesinado y lucha
por la tierra: dos experiencias.
Roy H. May. Cristianismo y
Sociedad, v. 26, no. 2 (1988), p. 73-
90. [About Bolivia and Costa Rica.]
Ministering in Nezahualcoyotl:
The Community as the Resource.
Mariano Avila. Urban Mission, v. 6
(November 1988), p. 33-42.
Mission and the Land: Whose Is
the Earth? Michael Knoch. One
World, no. 141 (December 1988),
p. 11-14. [About the Evangelical
Lutheran Church's Small Farm-
ers' Support Centre in Brazil.]
Missionaries to Nepal, Colombia
Find Freedom. Kenneth H. Sidey.
Christianity Today, v. 33 (April 7,
1989), p. 47-51.
A New Pentecost Hope in Soli-
darity. John H. Sinclair. Christian
Century, v. 106 (January 25, 1989),
p. 83-84. [About socioeconomic
conditions in Latin America.]
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Nicaragua: On Retreads and
Prayers. Susan E. Pierce. Witness,
v. 71 (April 1988), p. 14-24.
[About the Episcopal Church.]
"No somos personas extravagan-
tes." Analia Bernardo. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 110
(May 1989), p. 16-17. [About Pen-
tecostals in Latin America.]
One Nicaraguan Christian's
Perspective. Gustavo Paraj6n.
Christianity Today, v. 33 (March 3,
1989), p. 48.
Panorama del protestantismo en
Cuba: la presencia de los protes-
tantes o evangelicos en la historia
de Cuba desde la colonizaci6n
espaniola hasta la Revoluci6n.
Marcos Antonio Ramos. San Jose:
Editora Caribe, 1986.
Pentecostales enfrentan el desa-
fio continental. Anibal Sicardi.
Servicio de Informaciones Religiosas,
no. 110 (May 1989), p. 6.
Popular Religiosity and Evan-
gelization in Latin America.
Samuel Runz. SEDOS Bulletin,
no. 5 (May 15, 1988), p. 155-66.
Protestantism in Rural Guate-
mala, 1872-1954. Virginia
Garrard Burnett. Latin American
Research Review, v. 24, no. 2
(1989), p. 127-42.
Protestantismo e inmigraci6n en
Brasil: su implantaci6n en el con-
texto del proyecto liberal moder-
nizador y las consecuencias del
mismo. Martin N. Dreher.
Cristianismo y Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1
(1989), p. 59-74.
Protestantismo, liberalismo e
magonaria no Brasil do seculo
XIX. Lothar C. Hoch, ed. Estudos
Teoldgicos (Brazil), v. 27, no. 3
(1987), p. 195-279.
Das Reich der Freiheit: Uber-
legungen zur Funktion millenaris-
tischer Eschatologie in den
gesellschaftlichen Konflikten
Mittelamerikas. Heinrich Schaifer.
Zeitschrift fiir Missionswissenschaft
und Religionswissenschaft, v. 73, no.
2 (1989), p. 138-45.
The Revelations of Spiritual Bap-
tists in Barbados: 30th Anniver-
sary. Barbados, 1987.
The Roots and Fruits of Brazilian
Pentecostalism.John P. Medcraft.
Vox Evangelica, v. 17 (1987), p. 67-
94.
Surgimiento o invasi6n fun-
damentalista a America Latina?
Bernardo L. Campos. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 99-100
(April-May 1988), p. 15-17.
Symbols of Salvation: A Local
Mayan Protestant Theology.
David Scotchmer. Missiology, v. 17
(July 1989), p. 269-81.
The Ten-Year Crusade towards
the Third Christian Millennium:
An Account of Evangelization
2000 and Lumen 2000. Ralph
Della Cava. Paper presented at
the Conference on "The Right in
Latin American Democracies,"
Columbia University, April 20-21,
1990.
To Be a Poor Church. Mark
Olson. The Other Side, v. 25
(March-April 1989), p. 9-10.
[About Haiti.]
Too Much Separatism? M. E. Har-
rison. Urban Mission, v. 5 (March
1988), p. 40-41. [About Evangeli-
cal churches in Peru.]
Valores morais e liberalismo no
protestantismo batista da Bahia
no seculo XIX. Narli Geralda
Teixeira. Estudos Teoldgicos
(Brazil), v. 27, no. 3 (1987), p. 269-
79.
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Mexican Academic Clearing House
(MACH)
Materiales Academicos de Consulta
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.
* MACH sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books
and serials, including government publications.
* MACH handles selective blanket order services for
academic libraries.
* MACH gives free referral service and periodical book
lists.
Write for further information to MACH, Apartado Postal 13-319, Delegaci6n
Benito Jusrez, 03500, Mexico, D.F. Telephone numbers (915) 674-0567 and
(915) 674-0779.
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